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In this dissertation, I explore the effect of tax incentives on where U.S. multinationals 
decide to locate their innovative activities worldwide.  Research and development (R&D) 
tax incentives offered by foreign countries and differences between U.S. and foreign tax 
rates provide opportunities that may influence where multinationals decide to locate their 
innovative activities.  Using firm-level patenting data that identifies the country-specific 
location of innovations from 1986 to 2000, I examine the relation between innovative 
activities performed in a foreign country and these tax incentives using the Heckman 
(1979) two step estimation approach.  I find evidence that the foreign percentage of 
innovative activities is associated with the attractiveness of foreign R&D tax incentives 
and with an increase in the effect of U.S. R&D allocation rules.  In addition, the results 
suggest that firms in excess foreign tax credit positions decrease the amount of R&D 
activities in a foreign location with increased foreign tax rates, consistent with income 
shifting incentives.  In contrast, I find that the firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions 
increase their foreign R&D activities with increasing foreign tax rates.  This study is the 
first to examine and provide evidence of the influence of foreign R&D tax incentives and 
income shifting incentives on a U.S. multinational’s decision on where to locate R&D 






First, I am extremely grateful to God for the many blessings He has given me to help me 
complete this dissertation.  Most importantly, He has blessed me with family and friends 
whose love and support has meant the world to me throughout the Ph.D. process. 
 
I would like to thank my wonderful husband, Jeremy for his unwavering support, 
patience, unconditional love and continued faith in me.  I would not have made it through 
this through the Ph.D. program without you.  I also thank my two children, Tyler and 
Kaiya, for helping me to keep my perspective by reminding me about what is important. 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Ken Klassen, for his incredible support and 
guidance throughout the years of my graduate studies.  I feel extremely fortunate to be his 
student and have the opportunity to work with him.  His patience, understanding and 
insight have been invaluable to me. 
 
I would also like to thank my committee members, Drs. Bon Koo, Alan Macnaughton, 
and Christine Wiedman, for their helpful advice and great support throughout the 
dissertation process.  In particular, I would like to thank Alan Macnaughton for the great 




I have greatly enjoyed the friendship and encouragement from my fellow Ph.D. students: 
James Moore, Devan Mescall, Tom Schneider, Yao Tian, Leslie Berger, Darren 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................1 
1.1 Motivation .............................................................................................................................................1 
1.2 Research Study ......................................................................................................................................2 
1.3 Contributions and Implications ............................................................................................................4 
1.4 Dissertation Outline ..............................................................................................................................6 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................7 
2.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................7 
2.2 R&D Tax Incentives ..............................................................................................................................7 
2.3 Income Shifting Incentives .................................................................................................................. 11 
2.4 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER 3: TAX INCENTIVE INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................................................................................ 17 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 17 
3.2 Development of Innovation ................................................................................................................. 17 
3.3 Tax Incentives ..................................................................................................................................... 18 
3.3.1 R&D Tax Incentives ................................................................................................................... 18 
3.3.2 Income Shifting Incentives ......................................................................................................... 19 
3.3.3 Foreign Tax Credit System and Related Incentives .................................................................... 20 
3.4 Framework for Analysis and Hypothesis Development ...................................................................... 27 
3.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................... 35 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................... 37 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
4.2 Measure of Innovative Activities ......................................................................................................... 37 
4.3 Empirical Model ................................................................................................................................. 40 
4.3.1 Tax variables ............................................................................................................................... 41 
4.3.2 Non-tax Control Variables .......................................................................................................... 44 
4.3.3 Selectivity Bias ........................................................................................................................... 48 
4.4 Sample ................................................................................................................................................ 50 
4.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................... 51 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS ............................................................................................................................ 52 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 52 
5.2 Relationship between R&D Expenditures and Patents ....................................................................... 52 
5.3 Univariate Analysis............................................................................................................................. 52 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 54 
5.4.1 Selectivity Bias ........................................................................................................................... 58 
5.4.2 Multicollinearity.......................................................................................................................... 58 
viii 
 
5.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 59 
CHAPTER 6: SPECIFICATION ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 60 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 60 
6.2 Alternative Measures of Explanatory Variables ................................................................................. 60 
6.2.1 R&D Tax Incentives ................................................................................................................... 60 
6.2.2 Income Shifting Incentives ......................................................................................................... 61 
6.2.3 Country-level Control Variables ................................................................................................. 64 
6.2.4 Lagged Variables ........................................................................................................................ 66 
6.3 Estimation Approach .......................................................................................................................... 66 
6.4 Alternative Model Specifications to Address Multicollinearity .......................................................... 68 
6.5 Main results with Restricted Samples ................................................................................................. 69 
6.5.1 Profitable Multinationals ............................................................................................................. 69 
6.5.2 Main Foreign Country with R&D Activity ................................................................................. 70 
6.6 Dependence of Observations over Time ............................................................................................. 71 
6.7 ALLOC Variable ................................................................................................................................. 72 
6.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 73 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 74 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................. 77 
Appendix A: Foreign Tax Credit Limitations and the Marginal Tax Benefit of Domestic R&D 
expenditures ................................................................................................................................................. 77 
Appendix B: The B-Index Model ............................................................................................................... 81 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1:    B-Index and General R&D Tax Incentives for 21 OECD Countries, 1999-2000
 ................................................................................................................................... 90 
Table 2:   Illustration of U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules ................................................... 91 
Table 3:   Sample Characteristics ...................................................................................... 92 
Table 4:   Relationship of R&D Expenditures and Patenting ........................................... 95 
Table 5:   Descriptive Statistics for Firms with Foreign R&D Activities ......................... 96 
Table 6:   Pearson Correlation Table ................................................................................ 97 
Table 7:   Comparative Descriptive Statistics for Firms with Foreign R&D Activities vs. 
Firms with Domestic R&D Activities Only .............................................................. 98 
Table 8:   Results from Second Stage of Heckman (1979) Two Step Regression ............ 99 
Table 9:   Results from First Stage of Heckman (1979) Two Step Regression .............. 100 
Table 10: Multicollinearity Diagnostics ......................................................................... 101 
Table 11: Specification Check of the Measure of R&D Tax Incentives ........................ 102 
Table 12: Specification Check of FTR Measure: Main Empirical Model ...................... 103 
Table 13: Specification Check of FTR Measure: Selection Model ................................ 104 
Table 14: Specification Check of Country-Level Control Variables .............................. 105 
Table 15: Pearson Correlation Table: Country-Level Variables .................................... 107 
Table 16: Specification Check of One- and Two-Year Lags .......................................... 108 
Table 17: Specification Check of Estimation Approach: Main Empirical Model .......... 109 
Table 18: Specification Check of Estimation Approach: Selection Model .................... 110 
Table 19: Alternative Specifications of Equation (7) to Address Multicollinearity ....... 111 
Table 20: Specification Check Using Restricted Samples .............................................. 112 
Table 21: Specification Check Examining Dependence of Errors: Main Empirical Model
 ................................................................................................................................. 113 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
 In this dissertation, I examine the association between multi-jurisdictional tax 
incentives and a firm’s decision on where to locate their innovative activities.  In recent 
years, research and development (R&D) expenditures by U.S. multinationals (MNCs) in 
foreign locations has grown faster than their R&D spending in the United States.  U.S. 
majority-owned foreign affiliates’ investment in R&D increased 132% from $11.8 billion 
in 1994 to $27.5 billion in 2004.  In comparison, U.S. parent corporations had a slower 
increase in R&D investment over this same period of 66%, from $91.6 billion to $152.4 
billion (Yorgason, 2007).  R&D tax incentives and differences in corporate tax rates 
across countries provide opportunities that may influence a U.S. multinational’s decision 
on whether to conduct its R&D in the United States or abroad.   A limited number of 
empirical studies have provided evidence of the influence of tax policies on the decision 
on where to locate R&D activities.  As described more fully below, these studies have 
focused on the U.S. tax policies related to R&D and in particular, policy changes  
introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).  Using data aggregated at a 
country-level, Hines (1994) finds no evidence of a change in R&D performed abroad 
after the TRA86 while Vines and Moore (1996) find evidence of industries in excess 
foreign tax credit positions moving more R&D offshore under the R&D allocation rules.  
Hines and Jaffe (2001) demonstrate, at firm-level, that R&D performed abroad decreased 
after the change in the R&D allocation rules introduced by TRA86. Taken together, the 
evidence is unclear as to the effect of the U.S. R&D tax policies on the location decision 
for R&D.         
2 
 
 Differences in corporate tax rates create incentives to shift income out of high-tax 
jurisdictions into low-tax jurisdictions to minimize tax payments.  A number of studies 
have provided evidence suggesting that U.S. multinationals engage in cross-jurisdictional 
income shifting including Harris et al. (1993), Klassen at al. (1993), Harris (1993), Jacob 
(1996), Collins et al. (1998), Klassen and Laplante (2008) among others.  Kemsley 
(1998), Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), Grubert and Slemrod (1998) and Grubert (2003) 
provide evidence of the income shifting incentive influencing the location decision for 
certain corporate activities.  These activities included the location of production, interest 
deductions and capital investment.  The association between income shifting and the 
location decision for R&D has not been explored.  Because the value of intellectual 
property resulting from R&D activities can be particularly difficult to value, the location 
of R&D activities can be a useful method of achieving income shifting.   
1.2 Research Study 
To investigate the role of tax incentives on the international location of R&D 
activities, I develop a simple model for the decision of where to locate R&D activities.  
The model assumes managers determine where to locate their R&D activities by 
examining the difference in profits between a domestic and a foreign location.   Analysis 
of the model reveals that firms will increase their innovative activities in a foreign 
location in response to greater foreign R&D tax incentives and greater effects of the U.S. 
R&D allocation rules.  However, firms differ in their responsiveness to income shifting 
incentives based on their foreign tax credit positions.  Firms with excess foreign tax 
credits (i.e., firms with average foreign tax rates greater than the U.S. tax rate) reduce 
their foreign activity in favor of domestic R&D activities as the foreign tax rate rises but 
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firms in a deficit foreign tax credit position (i.e., firms with average foreign tax rates less 
than the U.S. tax rate) do not respond to changes in the foreign tax rate. 
I explore the predictions from this model by using data on patenting activity 
provided by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).   The patenting data allows 
me to infer the location of R&D activities based on the reported location of the inventors.  
R&D expenditures reported on a firm’s financial statements has traditionally been used as 
a measure of innovative activities.  However, the data on R&D expenditures is 
insufficient for my analysis since firms are not required to disclose the specific location 
of where the R&D occurred.  Patenting data was used to exploit the location information.   
For my analysis, I collect firm-level data on patenting activity in 20 Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries for the period 1986 to 
2000.  The sample was restricted to U.S. multinationals due to the availability of data in 
the patenting database and the matching of this database to financial data.  Using these 
data, I regress the percentage of patenting activity in a specific foreign country on proxies 
for the R&D tax incentives, the U.S. R&D allocation rules, the income shifting 
incentives, and control variables.  The empirical model is estimated using the Heckman 
(1979) two step estimation approach to control for the potential self selection bias in my 
sample.  With this approach, I first estimate a selection model where firms decide 
whether to perform R&D activities home or abroad.  From this regression, I extract the 
selection correction variable and include it in the estimation of the main empirical model.     
Consistent with the hypotheses, my results indicate that the percentage of 
innovative activities in a foreign country is associated with the attractiveness of the 
foreign R&D tax incentives and with an increased effect of the U.S. R&D allocation 
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rules.   In addition, I find evidence that U.S. MNCs in excess foreign tax credit positions 
decrease the amount of R&D activities in a foreign location as the foreign tax rate rises, 
consistent with the income shifting hypothesis.  However, in contrast to expectations, I 
find evidence of a positive relation between the foreign innovative activities and the 
foreign tax rate for firms in a deficit foreign tax credit position.  These findings are 
generally robust to various specification checks.  However, the conclusion related to the 
U.S. R&D allocation rules should be treated with caution as it was not robust to changes 
in the timing of its measurement, to changes in the estimation approach and to changes in 
the sample restrictions.  
1.3 Contributions and Implications 
This study makes several contributions.  First, it provides the first evidence of the 
influence of R&D tax incentives provided by countries other than the U.S. on where U.S. 
multinationals decide to locate their innovative activities.  To date, the research on R&D 
tax incentives has focused mainly on the response of U.S. companies to U.S. tax policies. 
As discussed by Hines (1994), U.S. policy makers are concerned about the growing 
amount of innovation offshore, and so my evidence of the positive association between 
foreign activity and foreign R&D tax incentives provides one reason why firms are 
moving innovative activities offshore.  In addition, the evidence is informative to foreign 
policy makers who are looking to attract U.S. R&D activities from U.S. MNCs.  In 
particular, a foreign country can increase the R&D activities from U.S. MNCs by 
increasing its R&D tax credit.  To illustrate, suppose the value of R&D tax incentives 
increased by 0.1 which could occur if Canada, for example, increased their R&D tax 
credit for foreign-controlled corporations by 15%, from 20% to 35%.  If the average 
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foreign value of R&D tax incentives increased by 0.1, U.S. MNCs would increase their 
foreign patenting activity by 9.4% on average, based on the coefficients estimated below. 
Another contribution of this study is that it adds evidence to the conflicting 
conclusions found in the literature investigating on the effect of the U.S. R&D tax 
policies.  My firm-level evidence supports and extends the country-level findings of 
Vines and Moore (1996) that the greater the effect of U.S. R&D allocation rules, the 
greater the foreign R&D activity.  My evidence conflicts with the firm-level evidence 
provided by Hines and Jaffe (2001).       
  In addition, the study provides the first investigation into the effect of the income 
shifting incentive on the location decision for R&D.  The evidence gives new information 
on the foreign tax rate a corporation relies on to determine its location for R&D.  The 
results suggest that the firm’s average foreign tax rate appears to be important to the 
location decision while the specific host country’s tax rate is not.  This study also 
provides additional evidence to the literature on multi-jurisdictional income shifting that 
has found the firms in excess foreign tax credit positions shift income into the U.S. by 
extending it to the location decision for R&D.  Finally, this study offers new firm-level 
evidence on the response of firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions to income shifting 
incentives.  The results suggest that as the foreign tax rate decreases, firms in the deficit 
foreign tax credit positions move R&D activities to the U.S.  This counter-intuitive 
finding may be explained by viewing royalty payments from the foreign subsidiary to the 
U.S. parent as flexible.  If the royalty is difficult to determine objectively, then the 
potential for future profit-shifting will increase with domestic R&D activity.  The benefit 
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of a flexible royalty increases as the foreign tax rate decreases for firms in a deficit 
foreign tax credit position.  However, further investigation is required.       
1.4 Dissertation Outline  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
description of the previous literature.  Chapter 3 discusses background institutional 
features regarding R&D tax incentives, income shifting incentives and the U.S. tax credit 
system.  These features are incorporated into a model of the location decision for R&D.  
Using this model, I derive my hypotheses.  Chapter 4 and 5 specify the research design 
and empirical results, respectively.  Chapter 6 provides specification checks of the results 
reported in Chapter 5.  Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This dissertation examines the effect of tax incentives on where U.S. 
multinationals decide to locate their innovative activities.  In this chapter, I review the 
literature related to the R&D tax incentives in Section 2.2 and the literature on multi-
jurisdictional income shifting in Section 2.3.  Section 2.4 summarizes the chapter.     
2.2 R&D Tax Incentives 
 Research on R&D tax incentives has primarily investigated the question of 
whether the tax incentives for R&D are cost-effective since there is little debate over 
whether the incentives should exist (Klassen et al., 2004).  Overall, the evidence suggests 
that R&D tax incentives increase R&D expenditures.  Firm-level studies examining the 
U.S. tax credit and its impact on R&D spending in the U.S. have found that the credit 
induces R&D spending of at least a dollar for each dollar of revenue foregone.  For 
example, Berger (1993), Gupta et al. (2004) and Klassen et al. (2004) estimate that the 
U.S. tax credit induces approximately $1.74, $2.40, and $2.96, respectively of R&D 
spending per dollar of revenue foregone.   Further evidence is provided in a recent study 
by Brown and Krull (2008) who find that R&D spending is positively related to the R&D 
tax credit rate and this association is increasing in R&D option exercises.   
 Firm-level evidence of the cost-effectiveness of R&D tax incentives of countries 
other than the United States has been limited but generally supports the conclusion that 
R&D tax incentives increase R&D spending.  A survey of the literature on the cost-
effectiveness of the R&D incentives by Hall and Van Reenen (2000) finds only 9 
research studies using firm-level data to investigate the R&D tax incentives of countries 
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other than the U.S.  These studies cover only 5 countries – Australia, Canada, France, 
Japan, and Sweden – with more than half focusing on the Canadian R&D tax incentive 
system.  For example, Bernstein (1986) estimates a cost effectiveness ratio for the 
Canadian incentives of between 0.8 and 1.7 using data on 27 firms from 1984.  More 
recently, Klassen et al. (2004), in their study comparing the R&D expenditures in the 
United States and Canada, find that the Canadian system induces $1.30 of additional 
R&D spending per dollar of taxes foregone compared to $2.96 by the U.S. system.       
Few studies have attempted to compare the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives 
across countries, mainly because of the difficulty in understanding the details of each 
system and in determining a comparable measure (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000).  These 
studies have been limited to country-level analysis.  Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 
(2003) and Falk (2006) study the impact of R&D tax incentives at a country-level for 
panels of OECD countries over the past two decades using the B-Index methodology 
developed by Warda (1996).  The B-index provides a composite measure of the 
attractiveness of R&D tax systems across countries.  They both find evidence that R&D 
tax incentives have a significant and positive impact on business R&D spending.  Bloom 
et al. (2002) estimate the user cost of R&D for nine OECD countries over a 19 year 
period and similarly find that R&D incentives are effective in increasing R&D intensity. 
A small number of studies examine how R&D tax incentives alter the decision of 
where to locate R&D activities and these studies have focused primarily on the U.S. 
R&D tax policies.  The research by Hines (1994), Vines and Moore (1996) and Hines and 
Jaffe (2001) examine the impact of U.S. R&D tax incentives on the location of R&D 
activities of U.S. multinationals.   Hines (1994) uses data aggregated at the country-level 
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from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to investigate whether U.S. 
corporations significantly increased the percentage of R&D performed abroad after the 
passage of TRA86.  TRA86 reduced the R&D tax credit from 25% to 20% and 
introduced the R&D allocation rules, effectively increasing the cost of R&D conducted in 
the U.S.  Based on these changes, U.S. firms were expected to increase the amount of 
R&D performed abroad.  However, Hines found that the percentage of R&D performed 
abroad stayed approximately the same at 10%.  Hines posits that after the passage of 
TRA86, the cost of R&D increased for some corporations but decreased for other 
corporations depending on their foreign tax credit positions, resulting in little overall 
movement of R&D abroad.  However, since Hines used aggregated data, he was unable 
to examine whether U.S. corporations, based on their foreign tax credit positions, 
responded differently to the changes of TRA86.  
 Vines and Moore (1996) examine whether the U.S. R&D allocation regulations 
and the R&D tax credit rules alter the worldwide location of R&D expenditures by U.S. 
MNCs.  Based on data aggregated at the country and industry for 1977, 1982 and 1989, 
the authors provide evidence that under the allocation rules,
1
 industries in excess foreign 
tax credit positions are more likely to locate R&D offshore than those with deficit foreign 
tax credit positions.  They also find that industries with high R&D growth decreased the 
percent of foreign-performed R&D in response to the R&D credit introduction in 1981 as 
the cost of U.S. R&D decreased for these corporations.  This evidence suggests that U.S. 
MNCs move R&D activity abroad if there is an increase in the after-tax cost of domestic 
R&D created by the U.S. R&D tax policy.    
                                                 
1
 R&D expenditures were required to be allocated to foreign-source income from 1977 through to 1981.  
From 1982 through 1986, the allocation regulations were suspended but after 1986, the regulations were 
again required (Vines and Moore, 1996). 
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 Hines and Jaffe (2001) investigate the effect of the introduction of the R&D 
allocation rules by TRA86 on the distribution of inventive activity between the United 
States and foreign countries.  Using firm-level data on patenting activities, Hines and 
Jaffe classify patenting activity as foreign or domestic based on the location of the first 
inventor listed on the patent.  In contrast to Vines and Moore (1996), they find that the 
level of R&D performed abroad decreased after TRA86 for U.S. MNCs in excess foreign 
tax credit positions even though the allocation rules increased the after-tax costs of 
domestic R&D for these firms.  Hines and Jaffe argue that this counter-intuitive finding 
may be because foreign and domestic innovative activities are complements rather than 
substitutes.  Another possibility for the counter-intuitive finding is the lack of control 
variables included in the analysis other than controlling for the level of foreign sales.  
Additional country- and firm-level non-tax factors may change the outcome of the results. 
 In this dissertation, I also use patenting activity to determine the location of R&D 
activity at a firm-level similar to Hines and Jaffe (2001).  But, I examine innovative 
activity in specific countries to investigate how foreign R&D tax incentives and a foreign 
country’s income tax rate alter the decision on where to locate R&D activities.  In 
addition, I investigate the influence of the R&D allocation rules on the location decision.  
Hines and Jaffe (2001) consider total foreign activity, not country-specific, and only 
investigate the effect of the R&D allocation rules on the location decision.   
In addition, this dissertation addresses the conflicting evidence provided by Hines 
(1994), Vines and Moore (1996) and Hines and Jaffe (2001) by providing further firm-
level evidence on how U.S. MNCs respond to the U.S. R&D tax policies.  This research 
also expands the investigation to include how R&D tax incentives and corporate income 
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tax rates from foreign countries and other non-tax factors effect where U.S. 
multinationals locate their R&D activities worldwide.   
2.3 Income Shifting Incentives 
Multinational corporations can reduce their tax liabilities by shifting income from 
high to low tax jurisdictions.  Existing studies find evidence consistent with this income 
shifting incentive at both country- and firm-levels.  Using 1982 data, Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) find a negative relationship between profit measures 
and foreign tax rates using country-level aggregate data on U.S. majority-owned 
affiliates.  The negative relationship is consistent with firms moving income from high-
tax rate jurisdictions to low-tax rate jurisdictions.   At a firm-level, further evidence of 
cross-jurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinationals is provided by several studies.  
Harris et al. (1993) find that the U.S. tax liability is related to the location of foreign 
subsidiaries for the period from 1984 to 1988 and the relation is consistent with tax-
motivated income shifting.  Klassen et al. (1993), Harris (1993) and Jacob (1996) 
examine U.S. multinationals response to the tax rate reductions of the TRA86.  Klassen et 
al. (1993) find that firms shifted income into the United States with the decrease in the 
tax rate from 46% to 34% in 1987 but firms shifted income out of the United States in 
1988 with the reduction in tax rates in other countries.  Harris (1993) also documents 
shifting into the U.S. after TRA86 with firms that are classified as highly flexible (high 
levels of interest, R&D, rent, and advertising) reacting more strongly to the income 
shifting incentives.   Jacob (1996) extends Harris (1993) by relating income shifting to 
the amount of international intrafirm transfers.  He finds that firms with large amounts of 
intrafirm transfers pay lower global taxes than other similar firms both before and after 
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TRA86, consistent with shifting income through transfer prices to reduce worldwide 
taxes.  
Collins et al. (1998) examine the difference in income shifting activities between 
firms facing high average foreign tax rates and firms facing low average foreign tax rates.  
They find evidence that suggests U.S. multinationals with average foreign tax rates that 
exceed the U.S. tax rate shift income into the Unites States.  On the other hand, the 
income shifting effect is considerably smaller for firms with average foreign tax rates less 
than the U.S. tax rate.  Klassen and Laplante (2008) examine this asymmetric income 
shifting response.  They posit that tax planning for income shifting is a multi-period 
consideration and so, the income shifting incentive should be measured over multiple 
periods and not annually as calculated by Collins et al. (1998) among others.  Using a 
multi-period analysis, Klassen and Laplante (2008) find that U.S. multinationals are 
equally engaged in shifting income into and out of the United States on average.   Thus, 
their study highlights the importance of considering how to measure the income shifting 
incentive as conclusions may change if the incentive is measured over multiple periods 
rather than annually.   
Rego (2003) and Krull (2004) also provide firm-level evidence consistent with 
cross-jurisdictional income shifting activities.  Rego (2003) finds that firms with more 
extensive international operations have lower worldwide effective tax rates (ETRs) and 
lower foreign ETRs, which is consistent with foreign operations improving a company’s 
ability to engage in income shifting.  Krull (2004) provides evidence that changes in 
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permanently reinvested foreign earnings are negatively related to the tax benefit of 
deductible repatriations,
2
 suggesting that firms shift income in response to tax incentives. 
Several studies investigate the sources of income shifting that provide firms with 
the greatest opportunities and incentives to shift income.  As previously discussed, Harris 
(1993) finds that firms with flexible expenses (high levels of interest, rent, advertising 
and R&D) are more likely to engage in income shifting activities.  However, the separate 
role of each of these expenses is not explored.  Jacob (1996) provides evidence that 
income shifting is related to a firm’s volume of intrafirm payments.   Further studies 
suggest that tax motivated income shifting is more easily accomplished when intrafirm 
payments involve difficult-to-value intellectual property and other intangibles.  
Generally, these intangibles are related to R&D activities (Matthews, 2002; Grubert, 
2003; and Mills and Newberry, 2004).   Matthews (2002) extends Collins et al. (1998) by 
examining the response of R&D intensive firms and finds that these firms are more likely 
to be engaged in income shifting activities, on average, than other firms.  Grubert (2003) 
finds that approximately half of the income that is shifted is related to R&D based 
intangibles and that R&D intensive firms appear to engage in more intercompany 
transactions and therefore, are engaged in more income shifting activities.  He does not 
find similar results for firms with intangibles linked to advertising.  Mills and Newberry 
(2004) find that income shifting incentives influence a multinational’s U.S. tax reporting 
but they did not find that firms with intangibles assets were more likely to engage in 
income shifting than other firms.  However, they use the ratio of reported intangible 
assets to total assets to investigate the role of intangibles associated with R&D activities.  
                                                 
2
 Deductible repatriations include payments of interest, rent, royalties, transfer prices and management fees 
from the foreign subsidiary to the U.S. parent. 
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Reported intangibles may consist of mainly purchased goodwill which is unrelated to 
intangibles such as intellectual property and so, is not a strong proxy for R&D 
intangibles. 
Although there is evidence that firms with R&D activities appear to engage in 
more income shifting activities, the literature has not yet explored whether the income 
shifting incentive alters the decision on where firms decide to locate their R&D activities.  
Previous literature has not provided evidence of the relationship between income shifting 
incentives and the decision to locate innovative activities as they did not use firm-level 
data that identified the country-specific location of R&D activities.  Financial disclosures 
of R&D expenditures do not provide specific detail on where R&D expenditures were 
incurred.  Therefore, these studies are unable to determine whether the R&D intensive 
firms shift income through reporting activities or through tax motivated location choices.  
Collins et al. (1998) discuss this potential issue by suggesting that their cross-
jurisdictional income shifting results for multinationals are also consistent with tax 
motivated location choices.  However, due to data constraints, they are unable to 
distinguish between the two possibilities.  The firm’s choice of where to locate high- and 
low-margin activities may account for the association between R&D expenditures and 
income shifting incentives found in previous studies if R&D intensive firms are more 
likely to locate high-margin activities in low-tax jurisdictions and low-margin activities in 
high-tax jurisdictions.  For example, Pfizer Inc., a pharmaceutical company, decided to 
locate the production of its top-selling drug, Lipitor, in the low tax jurisdiction of Ireland 
but distribute the drug through subsidiaries in the United States, a higher tax jurisdiction.  
The production of the drug can be viewed as a high-margin activity while the distribution 
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can be seen as a low-margin activity.  Thus, in this situation, there would be an 
association between income shifting incentives and R&D expenditures since Pfizer is an 
R&D intensive firm and has higher income reported in a low-tax jurisdiction.  This 
association would result from the decision to locate the high-margin activity in the low-
tax jurisdiction. 
Several studies have shown that the income shifting incentive is a significant 
influence on the location decision for certain corporate activities.  Kemsley (1998) 
investigates whether the difference in tax rates and export tax rules have an effect on the 
MNC’s production location choices.  He finds evidence that U.S. MNCs respond to the 
combined tax incentives by making real changes in the location of production.  Newberry 
and Dhaliwal (2001) examine whether tax incentives influence where U.S. MNCs locate 
their interest deductions worldwide.  Their results are consistent with U.S. MNCs 
locating interest deductions in different tax jurisdictions as a method of achieving tax-
motivated income-shifting.  Finally, Gruber and Slemrod (1998) and Grubert (2003) 
analyze how the choice of location for capital investment is influenced by income-
shifting incentives.  Grubert and Slemrod (1998) focus on U.S. investment in the low-tax 
country, Puerto Rico and find that the income shifting advantage is the main reason for 
U.S. investment in that country.  Grubert (2003) examines U.S. investments in both high-
tax and low-tax countries.  Using tax return data for 1996, Grubert finds evidence that 
R&D-intensive firms respond to opportunities for income shifting by investing in 
countries with either very high or very low statutory corporate tax rates.  Grubert suggests 
that intangible assets generated from R&D activities aid in shifting income in and out so 
that a very high or very low statutory rate attracts R&D intensive companies. 
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In this dissertation, I provide additional evidence on how income shifting 
incentives influence the location decision for U.S. multinationals.  Specifically, I directly 
examine the relationship between income shifting incentives and where a U.S. 
multinational decides to locate its R&D activities.  Unlike previous studies, I am able to 
determine the location of R&D activities through the use of data on patents rather than 
relying on R&D expenditures.   The patent database contains very detailed information 
about patented innovations including the location of the inventor.  Data on R&D 
expenditures does not provide this amount of detail.         
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Extant literature provides evidence that the domestic R&D spending and the 
location of that spending is influenced by the home-country R&D tax incentives.  I 
extend this literature by examining how the R&D tax incentives provided in foreign 
countries alter the location decision.  I also add additional evidence of the influence of the 
U.S. R&D allocation rules and its foreign tax credit system on the placement of R&D 
activities.  The literature on income shifting indicates that firms do shift income to reduce 
their corporate tax burden and that this incentive does influence the corporate decision on 
where to locate production, interest deductions and capital investment.  I add to this 
literature by providing evidence of the influence of the income shifting incentive on the 
location decision for R&D activities. 
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CHAPTER 3: TAX INCENTIVE INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the location decision facing U.S. 
multinationals for their R&D activities in Section 3.2  This discussion is followed by an 
explanation of the R&D tax incentives and income shifting incentives facing U.S. 
multinationals and the implications of the U.S. foreign tax credit system on these 
incentives in Section 3.3.  In Section 3.4, I develop a model of the decision on where U.S. 
multinationals decide to locate their R&D that includes consideration of the tax 
implications.  Using this model, I derive my hypotheses.  Section 3.5 provides a summary 
of the chapter.  
3.2 Development of Innovation 
 Innovations required by foreign subsidiaries to generate foreign sales can be 
provided to the foreign subsidiaries of multinationals using two basic methods: either the 
technology can be developed by R&D activities of the foreign subsidiary or the 
technology can be developed domestically and exported to the foreign country.  
According to American tax law and the tax laws of many other countries, the foreign 
subsidiary is required to pay royalties to the parent based on the fair market value of the 
technology provided by the U.S. parent (Hines, 1995). 
Based on data collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2001) on the R&D 
and royalty activities of majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals, U.S. 
multinationals use both methods to provide innovations to their foreign subsidiaries.  In 
1999, majority-owned foreign affiliates spent $18 billion on R&D activities and paid $25 
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billion in royalties to U.S. parents.  The information on the R&D activities of foreign 
affiliates is collected directly, but information on technology exports to foreign affiliates 
must be inferred by the royalty payments paid by the foreign affiliate.  Royalty payments 
should, theoretically, represent the value of exported technologies used (Hines, 1995).   
Firms must consider a variety of factors in their decision on where to develop 
their innovations.   Nontax factors include the availability of skilled workers, the legal 
environment such as patent protection laws and enforcement, proximity to customers, and 
the innovative environment of the country.  In addition, tax policies can be an important 
consideration in the decision process.  By engaging in the global environment, a U.S. 
MNC faces not only the U.S. tax policies but also the policies of the foreign countries 
that they enter.  The following section outlines the potential tax policies and incentives 
facing a U.S. MNC.  
3.3 Tax Incentives 
3.3.1 R&D Tax Incentives 
Investment in R&D has “always been extremely important to the economic well-
being of a country, resulting in the creation of new products, high-paying jobs, and high-
value exports” (Rashkin, 2007).  Consequently, to encourage and promote investment in 
R&D within their borders, many governments offer very attractive tax incentives relating 
to R&D.    For example, Canada provides a 20% tax credit for every dollar of qualified 
expenditures in R&D plus tax credits provided by the provinces.  As discussed in Warda 
(2002), tax incentives for R&D generally take three forms:  tax credits, special 
allowances deducted from taxable income, and tax deferrals.  Both tax credits and 
allowances reduce the amount of tax owed by a corporation but tax credits are applied 
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directly against tax owed while allowances are additional deductions over current 
business expenses that reduce the taxable income of the corporation, which also lowers 
the amount of tax owed.  Tax deferrals refer to incentives that delay the payment of tax 
such as accelerated deprecation rates and current deduction of R&D expenses.  The 
majority of countries have R&D incentives that allow firms to immediately deduct their 
R&D expenses against their taxable income.  In addition, many countries provide 
additional credits and/or allowances as shown in Table 1.  In 1999-2000, of the OECD 
countries included in Table 1, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and United States provide special tax credits.  Special allowances are 
provided by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland.  As a result, fifteen out of 
the 21 OECD countries included in Table 1 provide special tax credits or allowances for 
R&D activities.     
3.3.2 Income Shifting Incentives 
Differences between U.S. and foreign tax rates create incentives for U.S. MNCs 
to shift income out of high-tax jurisdictions into low-tax jurisdictions.  Firms can use this 
geographic income shifting as a planning method to minimize their taxes.   From 1999 to 
2002, U.S. multinationals have increased profits by 68 percent from foreign countries 
with low or no corporate income tax rates while total foreign profits earned by U.S. 
multinationals has increased by only 23 percent (Sullivan, 2004). 
Tax-motivated income shifting can be more easily accomplished when difficult-
to-value intangibles are involved.  All intrafirm transactions are subject to transfer pricing 
rules as required by American tax law and the tax laws of most other countries.  These 
rules specify that intrafirm transactions are to be at arm’s length prices.  However, 
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finding valid arm’s length transactions that are comparable for intangibles related to 
R&D activities can be very difficult (Grubert, 2003).  Thus, paying royalties for the use 
of innovations is one method of facilitating income shifting.  For example, Merck & Co., 
one of the largest pharmaceutical corporations in the United States, reduced its U.S. tax 
liabilities by approximately $1.5 billion over 10 years by transferring patents related to 
two of its highly successful drugs to Bermuda, a tax haven, and paying the Bermuda 
subsidiary for the use of the patents (Drucker, 2006).  However, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) challenged this arrangement in 2006 and Merck paid $2.3 billion in back 
taxes, interest and penalties as a settlement (Drucker, 2007).   
The income shifting incentives facing a U.S. multinational must also be 
considered with the U.S. foreign tax credit system.  As discussed in the next section, the 
foreign tax credit system can alter the income shifting incentive. 
3.3.3 Foreign Tax Credit System and Related Incentives 
For the description of the U.S. foreign tax credit system and the related incentives, 
I use the following information throughout the discussion as a simple illustration of the 
tax rules.  The details and related calculations used in the illustrations are summarized in 
Table 2.  Consider a U.S. multinational that has U.S. income of $1,000 and foreign 
income of $600 repatriated to the U.S. for a total worldwide income of $1,600.  The U.S. 
income includes $200 of R&D expenditures and a $100 royalty payment received from a 
foreign subsidiary.  In addition, U.S. sales are $4,000 while foreign sales are $1,000.   
Assume that the U.S. tax rate is 35%.  For the example, the U.S. multinational is in two 
possible situations; first, the firm faces an average foreign tax rate of 20% and second, the 
firm faces an average foreign tax rate of 50%. 
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3.3.3.1 Foreign Tax Credit System 3  
The U.S. tax law imposes taxes on the worldwide income of U.S. corporations 
regardless of where it is earned.  Taxable worldwide income includes income from U.S. 
sources and income from its foreign subsidiaries only when repatriated (in the form of 
dividends).
4
  Since both the U.S. and the host foreign countries may tax the same foreign-
source income, the U.S. tax law provides a foreign tax credit for income taxes paid to 
foreign governments.  Thus, the worldwide tax liability for a U.S. multinational is: 
 
 




The foreign tax credits can be applied against U.S. income tax liabilities but the 
U.S. tax law imposes limitations on the extent the foreign tax credits can reduce the U.S. 




If the U.S. tax rate is tUS, then the gross U.S. tax on worldwide income is   
tUS * Worldwide income.   Thus, the foreign tax credit limitation generally simplifies to:
 5
 
      
 
                                                 
3
 Description of the U.S. foreign tax credit system follow explanations provided by Scholes et al. (2005). 
4
 Taxable worldwide income also includes income from foreign branch profits.  In addition, Subpart F rules 
cause the passive income of subsidiaries to be taxed as earned.  However, these profits are not considered 
as part of the model developed in Section 3.4. 
5
 If the multinational has domestic losses so that the foreign-source income is greater than worldwide 
income, the United States requires that the ratio of foreign-source income to worldwide income be 




Net U.S. Tax on 
Worldwide Income 
Foreign Income 
Taxes = + 
Net U.S. Tax on 
Worldwide Income = 
Gross U.S. Tax on 
Worldwide Income 
Foreign Tax 
Credit  – 
 
Foreign Tax 





Gross U.S. Tax on 
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before foreign tax 
credits 
Foreign Tax 
Credit Limitation = Foreign-source Income * tUS 
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 As a result, the foreign tax credit is calculated as: 
          
To illustrate, consider the U.S. multinational described above.  For a firm facing 
the foreign tax rate equal to 20%, the firm owes $560 in gross U.S. taxes before foreign 
tax credits on its worldwide income and $120 of foreign taxes as seen in column (1) of 
Table 2.  The foreign tax credit, assuming at this point that the foreign-source income and 
the foreign income on which foreign taxes have been paid are the same, is:   
Foreign Tax Credit = min[$120 (Foreign Taxes), $210 (35% * Foreign-Source Income)] 
Therefore, the foreign tax credit is $120 so that net U.S. tax owing is $440 for a 
worldwide tax liability of $560.  In this situation, U.S. MNCs are said to be in a “deficit-
of-credit” position, or referred to as a deficit foreign tax credit position.  Although they 
receive a full credit for every dollar of foreign taxes paid, they still owe net U.S. tax on 
the foreign source income.  The net U.S. tax will be the difference between the U.S. tax 
rate (35%) and the foreign tax rate (20%) multiplied by the foreign-source income, or 
$90.   
Now, suppose instead that the U.S. multinational faces an average foreign tax rate 
of 50%.   In this case, the gross U.S. tax before the foreign tax credit remains at $560 but 
the foreign tax credit is now $210 as seen in column (2) of Table 2.  The foreign tax 
credit is the minimum of $300 of foreign taxes and $210 of U.S. tax on the foreign-source 
income.   The U.S. tax on the foreign income is fully offset by the $210 foreign tax credit.  
But, the foreign tax credit limitation only allowed the credit to increase by $90, although 
the increase in the foreign tax rate increases foreign taxes by $180.   Thus, the firm is said 
to be in an “excess” foreign tax credit position because it can only apply a partial credit 




for the foreign taxes paid.  The excess foreign taxes of $90 are eligible for carryover 
provisions.     
An important feature of the U.S. tax system is the deferral of U.S. taxation on 
certain foreign earnings.  A subsidiary’s foreign income is taxed initially in the foreign 
country where it is reported, but it is only taxable in the U.S. when that foreign income is 
repatriated to the United States.  This may appear to create an incentive for corporations 
with foreign earnings taxed at a low rate (i.e. in a deficit foreign tax credit position) to 
reinvest abroad and delay repatriating income from their foreign subsidiaries.  Referring 
back to the example, the firm in a deficit position paid $90 in U.S. tax on its foreign 
earnings on repatriation.  This $90 of U.S. tax could be deferred if the repatriation of the 
foreign earnings is delayed.  However, the firm in an excess foreign tax credit position 
does not pay any additional U.S. tax on the foreign earnings, and so does not benefit from 
any deferral.  Therefore, reinvesting the foreign earnings abroad defers the U.S. tax on 
repatriation if the firm is in a deficit foreign tax credit position but as outlined by Scholes 
et al. (2005), “this benefit is offset by the fact that reinvesting causes the deferred taxes to 
grow in direct proportion to the growth of the investment” (p. 306).  Then, as initially 
shown by Hartman (1985), if the domestic and foreign pre-tax returns are similar, the 
present value of U.S. tax payments on deferring repatriation is not reduced.   
3.3.3.2 U.S. R&D Allocation Rules6 
The current U.S. tax law allows for an immediate deduction of R&D expenditures 
that otherwise might be capitalized.  However, for the foreign tax credit calculations only, 
the U.S. tax law prevents U.S. corporations with foreign income from deducting all of 
                                                 
6
 Description of the U.S. R&D allocation rules follows explanations provided by Hines and Jaffe. (2001) 
and Hines (1998). 
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their U.S. R&D expenditures against their U.S.-source income.  Instead, U.S. tax law 
requires the R&D expenditures to be allocated between domestic- and foreign-source 
incomes through a couple of specified methods outline in Appendix A.  As discussed by 
Hines and Jaffe (2001), the purpose of the allocation rules is to maintain the relatively 
generous treatment of R&D, but only for that part of a firm’s R&D expenditures that is 
necessary to generate sales in the domestic markets.  At least some of the R&D activities 
of firms with foreign sales and foreign income are presumed to enhance foreign 
profitability.  Further technical details on the application of the R&D allocation rules, 
refer to Appendix A.   
For taxpaying firms, the allocation of the R&D expenditures between foreign and 
domestic income for the foreign tax credit calculation may potentially be quite important.  
For the purposes of U.S. foreign tax credit purposes only, R&D expenditures that are 
deemed to be foreign reduce foreign taxable income. Foreign governments are not 
obligated to use the allocation methods used by the U.S., and so generally do not allow 
U.S. corporations to reduce their taxable income in foreign countries on the basis of R&D 
undertaken in the U.S.  As a result, an R&D expenditure allocated against foreign-source 
income only benefits the firm if the firm pays U.S. tax on the foreign-source income.   If 
the firm is in a deficit foreign tax credit position, then the firm pays some U.S. tax on its 
foreign income, and so any R&D deductions allocated against foreign income reduces the 
firm’s U.S. tax owing on the foreign income.  Therefore, allocating R&D expenses 
between foreign-source and domestic-source income does not change the net U.S. tax 
owing for firms in a deficit foreign tax credit position and so these firms are indifferent to 
the allocation rules.   However, if a firm is in an excess foreign tax credit position, the 
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R&D allocation rules can increase the amount of net U.S. tax owing since the allocation 
rules decrease the foreign tax credit limitation.  Foreign tax credits applied by firms in 
excess foreign tax credit positions are constrained to the foreign tax credit limitation. 
To illustrate how the U.S. allocation rules influence the amount of worldwide 
taxes owing, column (3) and (4) of Table 2 incorporates the $200 in domestic R&D 
expenditures included in the U.S. Income for the example U.S. multinational into the 
foreign tax credit calculation.  Under the allocation rules, $20 of the $200 in R&D 
expenditures is allocated to the foreign-source income for the foreign tax credit 
calculations only.
 7
  Now, the foreign-source income for the foreign tax credit is $580 so 
that the foreign tax credit cannot be greater than $203 as seen in column (3) and (4) Table 
2.  In column (3) where the firm faces a foreign tax rate of 20% (i.e. a deficit foreign tax 
credit position), the worldwide tax liability of $560 for the U.S. multinational has not 
changed with the allocation rules since the minimum for the foreign tax credit remains 
the foreign taxes paid of $120. On the other hand, in column (4) where the average 
foreign tax rate is 50% (i.e. an excess FTC position), the worldwide tax liability has now 
increased to $657.   In this case, in comparison to no allocation rules, the allocation of 
R&D expenditures to foreign-source income reduced the applicable foreign tax credit by 
$7 (35%*20) from $210 to $203 and so, the net U.S. tax liability increased by $7.  This 
demonstrates that the allocation of domestic R&D expenditures can actually increase the 
amount of net U.S. tax owing. 
                                                 
7
 Based on the allocation method based on sales described in Appendix A, the allocation is determined as 
50% * foreign sales/worldwide sales * R&D expenditures or 50%*20%*$200. 
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3.3.3.3 Taxation of Royalty Receipts 
For U.S. foreign tax credit purposes only, royalty income received by a U.S. 
MNC from a foreign subsidiary is deemed to be foreign-source income of the MNC.  For 
this reason, foreign tax credits can be applied against the gross U.S. tax owing on the 
royalty receipts even though no foreign tax has been paid on that royalty.  U.S. MNCs 
with deficit foreign tax credits must pay net U.S. income tax on these royalty receipts as 
the MNCs do not have unused credits available to offset the net U.S. tax owing.  Turning 
back to the example, consider the $100 in royalty payments from the foreign subsidiary to 
the U.S. parent included in the U.S. income for the example U.S. multinational as seen in 
column (5) and (6) of Table 2.  In both cases, the foreign source income is now adjusted 
to include the $100 royalty payment for a total of $680 so that the foreign tax credit 
limitation is now $238.  As seen in column (5) of Table 2 , where the average foreign tax 
rate is 20%, once again, the worldwide tax liability remains at $560. 
In contrast, multinationals with excess foreign tax credits can apply excess credits 
against U.S. taxes due on the royalties, essentially eliminating the U.S. tax liability 
generated by the royalty receipts.  Thus, even if its foreign subsidiary faces a lower 
foreign tax rate, the multinational with excess foreign tax credits may choose to shift 
income into the U.S. using royalties.   This is evident by considering the change in taxes 
owing on the firm when it faces the average foreign tax rate of 50% in the example.  
Comparing column (4) and (6) of Table 2, the foreign tax credit increases from $203 to 
$238 and the worldwide tax liability decreases from $657 to $622.  Thus, the worldwide 
tax liability is reduced by the net U.S. tax on the royalty of $35 since the royalty receipt 
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was deemed to be foreign-source and the firm was in an excess foreign tax credit 
position. 
3.3.3.4 Summary of Foreign Tax Credit Rules 
In summary, the U.S. foreign tax credit rules add complexity to how taxes 
influence the decisions of multinational corporations.  For firms in deficit foreign tax 
credit positions, the R&D allocation rules and the treatment of royalty payments paid 
from foreign subsidiaries to U.S. parents do not change the amount of net U.S. tax owing.  
However, if a firm is in an excess foreign tax credit position, the R&D allocation rules 
can increase the amount of net U.S. tax owing while the treatment of royalties can 
decrease the amount of net U.S. tax owing.  The R&D allocation rules and treatment of 
royalties have implications for multinationals that decide to have domestic R&D 
activities. 
3.4 Framework for Analysis and Hypothesis Development  
I develop a simple model to explain the location decision for R&D activities and 
incorporate the tax implications described above.  From this model, I derive the 
hypotheses to be tested.   
First, consider a U.S. multinational corporation with established operations in a 
foreign subsidiary.  Part of the foreign subsidiary’s operations includes income generated 
from some innovative output.
8
  The R&D activities required to produce the future 
innovative output can either be performed by the foreign subsidiary or the U.S. parent 
corporation.  The source of the financing required to perform the R&D activities in either 
                                                 
8
 Following Hines and Jaffe (2001), I assume that firms are able to determine the ultimate location of the 
uses of their innovative output at the time they perform the initial R&D. 
28 
 
location is independent of the decision of where to locate the R&D so it is ignored 
throughout the analysis.  In addition, I assume that taxable revenue and cash flow from 
the innovation is equal.  If the R&D activities are performed by the foreign subsidiary, 
the expected present value of after-tax profits per $1 of foreign R&D investment, πAbroad 
is as follows: 
πAbroad = CF(1 – tF*) – (1 – RDIF)        (1) 
CF is the expected present value of innovation-related cash flows generated by 
the foreign subsidiary.  The expected present value of the foreign tax incentives available 
for the R&D activities are reflected in RDIF so that (1 – RDIF) is the foreign after-tax cost 
of $1 of expenditure on R&D.    
The income of the foreign subsidiary is first taxed by the foreign government at 
the foreign statutory corporate tax rate (tF) when the income is earned.  However, the 
foreign income is also potentially subject to U.S. tax when the foreign earnings are 
repatriated to the parent in the form of the dividend.  Thus, the “effective” foreign tax 
rate, tF*, reflects the potential impact of the repatriation decision by the U.S. 
multinational.  As a simplifying assumption, firms are assumed to repatriate their foreign 
earnings immediately.  Further discussion on the effects of the repatriation decision is 
discussed below. 
The R&D activities of a foreign subsidiary could also be used to enhance the sales 
of the domestic U.S. parent.   However, U.S. multinationals perform the majority of their 
R&D in the United States.   In 2005, R&D conducted by U.S. parents accounted for 86 
percent of worldwide expenditures by U.S. multinationals (Mataloni, 2007).  As 
discussed by Hufbauer (1992), one reason for the relatively small amount of R&D 
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performed abroad is that U.S. multinationals prefer to conduct the majority of their R&D 
close to home, also referred to as the “headquarters effect.”  Thus, R&D directed at the 
U.S. market by U.S. multinationals is likely performed in the U.S. in most cases.  There is 
also a very strong tax reason for why U.S. multinationals perform little R&D abroad for 
use in the U.S. market.  As described by Hines (1994), one of the difficulties faced by 
U.S. multinationals in such situations is that the royalty payment required from the U.S. 
parent to the foreign subsidiary will essentially be taxed twice.  Under Subpart F income 
rules, the royalty income received by the foreign subsidiary will be immediately taxable 
in the U.S. rather than taxable on repatriation into the U.S.  The royalty income will be 
deemed US source for US tax purposes and therefore, the foreign tax credits from the 
foreign tax paid will not be applicable against the US tax liability.  As a result, the U.S. 
MNC will pay both full U.S. and foreign tax on the royalty income, a very expensive 
endeavor.  For these reasons, the analysis does not consider that the R&D performed by 
the foreign subsidiary could be exploited in the U.S. 
The alternative to having the R&D activities performed in the foreign country is 
to develop the innovations domestically.  If the U.S parent develops the innovations, U.S 
tax law and most foreign tax laws effectively require the foreign subsidiary to pay rents 
or royalties to the parent for the fair market value of innovations used by the foreign 
subsidiary.  As a result, the foreign subsidiary’s cash flows related to the innovation will 
be the difference between the gross profit generated from the innovation in the foreign 
market and royalty payments made to the parent corporation while the parent firm will 
have royalty receipts from the foreign subsidiary less the costs of developing the 
innovation.   The multinational corporation that generates the innovations domestically 
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and then provides the innovations to the foreign subsidiary has the expected present value 
of after-tax profits, πDomestic:
 9
 
πDomestic=[CF – R](1 - tF*) + R(1 – tUS) – [1 – RDIUS] +  z[R – ALLOC]tUS     (2) 
 In equation (2), R is the expected present value of royalties that the subsidiary is 
required to pay to the U.S. parent corporation for use of the parent’s innovations; and tUS 
is the domestic tax rate.  The expected present value of the U.S. tax incentives available 
for the R&D activities is captured by RDIUS.   ALLOC is the fraction of the domestic 
R&D expenditures to be deducted against foreign source income for foreign tax credit tax 
purposes.  Finally, z is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm is in an excess 
foreign tax credit position and is equal to zero if the firms is in a deficit foreign tax credit 
position.      
The final expression, z[R – ALLOC]tUS, in equation (2) represents the effects of 
the foreign tax credit position on the expected profit of the firm.   The foreign tax credit 
position is important as it influences the effect of U.S. taxes on royalties and the U.S. 
R&D allocation rules.  For purposes of this analysis, the foreign tax credit position is 
treated as exogenous and so, the two possible conditions, excess and deficit, are 
separately considered here.   
First, I consider the implications for firms in excess foreign tax credit positions 
(i.e. z = 1).  Recall that royalty income received by the U.S. parent will be classified as 
foreign-source income for the foreign tax credit calculation.  As a result, the U.S. tax on 
royalty receipts is offset by the increase in the foreign tax credit if the firm is in an excess 
foreign tax credit position.  Thus, royalty income for such firms is effectively untaxed.  
                                                 
9
 The model assumes that the cost of an R&D input to produce an innovative activity is similar across 
countries.  In the empirical model, I control for difference in costs to the extent that this is not true. 
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However, these firms are also influenced by the U.S. allocation rules.   As discussed 
previously, firms are required to allocate domestic R&D expenditures between U.S.-
source and foreign-source income for purposes of the foreign tax credit calculations.  A 
firm in the excess foreign tax credit position does not pay U.S. tax on the foreign income 
and so a reduction in foreign income through the R&D expenditure allocation does not 
provide a tax benefit to the firm.  Therefore, the allocation rules reduce the benefit of 
R&D deductions for these firms.  Based on this discussion, equation (2) for firms in the 
excess foreign tax credit position (z = 1), can be reduced to the following: 
    πDomestic-Excess= (CF – R)(1 - tF*) + R – (1 – RDIUS) – (ALLOC)(tUS)    (3) 
The multinational corporation can decide where to locate innovative activities by 
simply comparing the after-tax profits from the two alternatives [πAbroad– πDomestic-Excess or 
ΔπExcess].
10
  If this difference is greater than zero, the multinational will locate R&D 
activities in the foreign location to maximize technology-related profits and if the 
difference is less than zero, the multinational will locate R&D activities domestically.  
Thus, in the first situation where z = 1, subtracting (3) from (1): 
    ΔπExcess = [CF(1 - tF*) – (1 - RDIF)] – [(CF – R)(1 - tF*) + R – (1 – RDIUS) – (ALLOC)(tUS)] 
              = R(1 - tF*) – R – (1 – RDIF) + (1– RDIUS) + (ALLOC)(tUS)   
         = R( – tF*) + (RDIF – RDIUS) + (ALLOC)(tUS)        (4) 
                                                 
10
 The model assumes that the choice of location is between the U.S. and one foreign country.  In reality, 
the U.S. multinational may consider more than one foreign country in their decision.  In this case, they can 
compare the potential after-tax profits from the foreign countries to determine the optimal foreign country 
to locate R&D activities.  For example, if the U.S. multinational was considering placing R&D activities in 
either Canada or Mexico, they can compare πCAN = CF(1 – tCAN) – (1 – RDICAN) and πMEX = CF(1 – tMEX) – (1 
– RDIMEX) so that the additional optimality condition is πCAN  - πMEX = CF(tMEX – tCAN) + (RDICAN  – 
RDIMEX).  Thus,  introducing more than one foreign country just adds to the conditions. 
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  The U.S. tax rate (tUS) and the U.S. R&D tax incentives (RDIUS) have minimal 
changes during the time period from 1986 to 2000 investigated in this study.  For this 
reason, tUS and RDIUS are not included as part of the hypotheses developed below. 
Equation (4) shows that a U.S. multinational’s decision on where to locate 
innovative activities can be influenced by several factors.  Clearly, the R&D tax 
incentives available in the foreign country and in the U.S. (i.e. RDIF - RDIUS) impact 
where the U.S. multinational will locate R&D activities.  If the foreign country provides 
more generous R&D tax incentives than the U.S. (i.e. RDIF > RDIUS), the multinational 
has the incentive to locate the R&D activities in the foreign country.  Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following: 
HYPOTHESIS 1a: For firms in excess foreign tax credit positions, the greater the 
foreign R&D tax incentives (RDIF), the more U.S. multinationals locate 
innovative activities in the foreign location, ceteris paribus.   
 
The U.S. allocation rules for domestic R&D expenditures are represented by 
ALLOC in equation (4).  For firms in an excess foreign tax credit position, the allocation 
rules increases the cost of R&D activities located in the U.S. for use abroad.  The 
allocation rules reduce foreign source earnings, leading to less U.S. tax allocated to 
foreign earnings for the foreign tax credit calculation.  This adjustment is only costly to 
the firm if U.S. tax on foreign earnings is constraining; e.g. when foreign tax rates exceed 
the U.S. tax rate.  With the increase in cost of domestic R&D activities, the U.S. 
multinational has an incentive to locate the activities in the foreign country.  Thus, my 
second hypothesis, stated in the alternative is: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: For firms in excess foreign tax credit positions, the greater the 
effect of the U.S. allocation rules (ALLOC), the more U.S. multinationals locate 




The incentive to shift income to the foreign jurisdiction is represented by the first 
term, R(– tF*), in equation (4).  For firms in an excess foreign tax credit position, 
repatriation does not trigger any additional U.S. taxes and so the “effective” foreign tax 
rate (tF*) in equation (4) is approximately equal to the statutory foreign tax rate, tF.
11
  
Therefore, U.S. multinationals have greater incentives to shift income into the U.S. to 
reduce the worldwide tax burden as the foreign tax rate increases.  This leads to the third 
hypothesis, stated in the alternative:  
HYPOTHESIS 3:  For firms in excess foreign tax credit positions, the greater the 
foreign tax rate for U.S. multinationals (tF), the less U.S. multinationals innovate 
in the foreign country, ceteris paribus. 
 
For the remaining discussion, I consider the implications for firms in a deficit 
foreign tax credit position, (i.e. z = 0) in the final expression, z[R – ALLOC]tUS , of 
equation (2).  Firms in this position receive a foreign tax credit equal to all foreign taxes 
paid.  Thus, such a firm will owe U.S. taxes on the royalty receipts even though they are 
considered to be foreign earnings for the foreign tax credit calculation.  But, the U.S. 
taxes owed by these firms also will not be altered by the allocation rules represented by  
 
ALLOC.  Therefore, when z = 0, equation (2) will be: 
    πDomestic-Deficit= (CF – R)(1 - tF*) + (R)(1 – tUS) – (1 - RDIUS)      (5) 
 Comparing the after-tax profits from performing the R&D activities in a foreign 
location or domestically (πAbroad– πDomestic-Deficit or ΔπDeficit) by subtracting (5) from (1), 
results in the following: 
    ΔπDeficit  = [CF(1 - tF*) – (1 - RDIF)] – [(CF – R)(1 - tF*) + R(1 – tUS) – (1 - RDIUS)] 
                                                 
11
 As a simplifying assumption, I assume immediate repatriation of foreign earnings.  If the foreign 
earnings are never repatriated, the effective foreign tax rate, tF*, remains the foreign tax rate, tF.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 does not change by relaxing the repatriation assumption. 
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           = R(tUS – tF*) – (1 – RDIF) + (1 – RDIUS)     
       = R(tUS – tF*) + (RDIF - RDIUS)            (6) 
If equation (6) is greater than zero, then the U.S. multinational will prefer to 
locate R&D activities in the foreign country.  But if the equation is less than zero, the 
U.S. multinational will prefer to locate in the United States. 
Based on equation (6), the decision on where to locate R&D activities is 
influenced by the R&D tax incentives and income shifting incentives for firms in a deficit 
FTC position.  Similar to firms in an excess FTC position, the R&D tax incentives 
available in the foreign country, relative to that in the U.S. can alter a U.S. 
multinationals’ decision on where to locate R&D activities.  As a result, Hypothesis 1b 
mirrors Hypothesis 1a for firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions: 
HYPOTHESIS 1b:  For firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions, the greater the  
foreign R&D tax incentives (RDIF), the more U.S. multinationals locate 
innovative activities in the foreign location, ceteris paribus. 
 
In testing, hypotheses 1a and 1b are tested together. 
The incentive to shift income to a foreign jurisdiction is represented by R(tUS – 
tF*) for firms in a deficit foreign tax credit position.  This expression is altered by the 
U.S. taxes required on repatriation.  The repatriated earnings will effectively bear U.S. 
tax on the difference between the foreign tax rates and the U.S. tax rate.  In this case, the 
effective foreign tax rate, tF* may approach the U.S. tax rate, tUS.  Thus, the tUS – tF* from 
equation (6) while positive, may be approximately zero.  So I predict that the equation (6) 
and hence, the decision to locate R&D activities in a foreign location, is unrelated to the 
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statutory foreign corporate tax rate.
12
  Even though I don’t expect to reject the null based 
on this analysis, my fourth hypothesis, stated in the alternative form is: 
HYPOTHESIS 4:  For firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions, a U.S. 
multinational’s decision on where to locate R&D activities is related to the 
foreign tax rate (tF), ceteris paribus. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
U.S. multinationals may decide to locate their R&D activities either domestically 
in the United States or in a foreign location.  This decision may be influenced by a variety 
of factors including tax incentives related to R&D and income shifting.  However, it is 
important to consider the effect of the U.S. foreign tax credit system on these incentives.  
Under the U.S. foreign tax credit system, U.S. multinationals with excess foreign tax 
credits may be able to eliminate U.S. taxes owing on royalty receipts by applying their 
excess foreign tax credits against the U.S. tax owing on the receipts.  But, they may not 
be able to fully realize the benefit of their U.S. R&D expenditures under the allocation 
rules.  In contrast, the tax treatment of royalties or the allocation rules for domestic R&D 
deductions do not alter the taxes owing for multinationals in deficit foreign tax credit 
positions.   
I develop a model of the location decision for innovative activities and 
incorporate the tax incentives and U.S. tax system described in this chapter.  Based on 
this model, I hypothesize that the foreign R&D activity of domestic U.S. multinationals is 
influenced by the R&D tax incentives provided by the foreign country.  In addition, the 
                                                 
12
 If the foreign earnings are reinvested and repatriated sometime in the future rather than immediately, the 
effective foreign tax rate will still approach the U.S. tax rate.  As initially discussed by Hartman (1985), for 
firms in a deficit position, reinvesting abroad defers the tax on repatriation but the benefit of the deferral is 
offset by the increase in the future repatriation taxes on the growth of the reinvestment abroad.  Based on 
the present value analysis by Scholes et al. (2005), there is little or no benefit to deferring repatriation from 
a low-tax rate foreign jurisdiction if the after-tax foreign rate of return is the same as the after-tax domestic 
rate of return.   
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U.S. R&D allocation rules may alter this location decision.   Finally, I hypothesize that a 
firm’s decision to where to locate R&D activities is negatively related to the foreign 
corporate tax rate if the firm is in an excess foreign tax credit position.  However, a firm 








CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research design and sample used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3.  I begin with a description of how I determine where firms locate 
their innovative activities using patents in Section 4.2.  Section 4.3 describes the 
empirical model and Section 4.4 describes the sample used to test the hypotheses.  
Section 4.5 concludes.   
4.2 Measure of Innovative Activities 
 Testing the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter requires an observable 
measure of where U.S. MNCs are performing their innovative activities.  A common 
proxy for R&D activities in firm-level studies has been R&D expenditures reported in the 
financial statements.  However, reported R&D expenditures do not specify where the 
expenditures were incurred as firms are not required to provide specific detail on the 
location of the expenditures.   Following Hines and Jaffe (2001), I use data on patents as 
an alternative proxy for innovative activities.  According to Hall et al. (2005), economic 
literature has viewed patents as a very rich source of data for the study of innovation and 
technological change for a very long time.  However, using patents as an indication of 
innovation does have some drawbacks as discussed by Griliches (1990) and Hall et al. 
(2005) who point out that “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are 
patented and the inventions that are patented differ greatly in quality, in the magnitude of 
output associated with them” (p.1669).  Before estimating the empirical model, I verify 
the strong relationship between R&D activities and patenting in Section 5.2.  
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I obtain data on patenting activities from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO).  The patent database created by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) and Case Western Reserve University 
13
 contains detailed information 
about patents granted by the USPTO including technological classification of the patents, 
the inventors, the geographic location of the inventors, corporate assignee (if any) to 
whom the patent rights are transferred by the inventors, citations between patents, etc.  
This database has been linked to Compustat based on the assigned corporation.  
The patent information allows me to identify the location of innovative activities 
based on the geographic location of inventors specified on each patent.
 14
  Based on these 
locations, I can determine the number of patents granted to each country for each firm.  
Thus, I calculate the dependent variable, PATENT%, as the yearly percentage of patents 
granted to a particular country for each firm as follows: 
  
PATENT%i,j,t =  
   
A patent may potentially list multiple inventors from multiple locations.   If a 
patent lists multiple inventors from one particular country, the patent is only counted as 
one.  For example, a patent listing three inventors who are all from Canada will be 
counted as one patent from Canada.  Another possibility is a patent listing inventors from 
multiple jurisdictions. In this case, the patent is counted as a fraction of a patent granted 
to a foreign country.  For example, if a patent has inventors from both Canada and the 
United States, the patent is counted as ½ Canadian.  The number of patents that have 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed description of the database, see Hall et al. (2001). 
14
 The locations of inventors identified on the patent applications are domestic residences and not 
citizenships or nationalities (Hines and Jaffe, 2001). 
# of patents granted to firm i in country j in year t 
total # of patents granted to all countries for firm i in year t 
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inventors from multiple countries is fairly small as approximately 97% of the patents 
included in my analysis have inventors listed from one country.
15
 
My analysis includes only those patents that have been assigned to a corporation 
at the time of application.  Patents must be taken out by the individual or individuals who 
created the invention.  Thereafter, the title or right to a patent can be transferred or 
assigned to third party such as a firm, a person, a government organization, university, 
etc.  The first assignment of a patent usually takes place within the firm at which the 
inventor is employed.  Labor contracts generally specify that employees must assign the 
rights of their inventions to the firm or organization in which they work (Serrano, 2006).   
Approximately 78 per cent of all patents are assigned at the time of patent application to a 
corporation (Hall et al., 2001). 
Each patent contains two dates; the date the inventor filed for the patent and the 
date the patent was granted.  Clearly, the patented invention would be completed closer to 
the application date rather than to the grant date.  Inventors have a strong incentive to 
apply for a patent as soon as possible following the completion of an innovation, whereas 
the grant date depends upon the review process at the Patent Office, which takes on 
average about 2 years (Hall et al., 2001).  Consequently, patents are allocated to a 
particular year based on the application date of a patent.   
Another important consideration for this study is the timing of the decision on 
where to locate the R&D activities and the related patenting activities.  Hall et al. (1986) 
find evidence suggesting that the bulk of the relationship between R&D expenditures and 
patent activity is close to contemporaneous.  Significant lag effects are also found but are 
                                                 
15
 Jaffe et al. (1993) report similar statistics in their investigation of the extent of geographic dispersion 
among inventors.   
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relatively small and not well estimated.  Based on these findings, I measure the country-
level and firm-level factors effecting the decision on where to locate innovative activities 
contemporaneously.  In supplemental analysis, I also estimate the empirical model 
described below using one-year and two-year lags to explore how using lags of the 
variables may change the conclusions. 
4.3 Empirical Model 
 To explore the firm and country-level characteristics that may have an effect on 
the percentage of innovative activities that a U.S. MNCs undertakes in a particular 
foreign country, I estimate the following model:   
PATENT%i,j,t = 0 + 1RDIj,t + 2ALLOCi,t + 3FTRi,t + 4FTCi,t + 5FTRi,t*FTCi,t  
+ 6I_Indexj,t + 7RDWagej,t + 8FSRi,t + 9Qi,t  + 10ROAi,t +11CITESi,t 
+ 12InvMillsi,t + ∑13YEARt + ∑14INDi+ i,j,t        (7) 
where: 
 
PATENT%i,j,t = the number of patents granted to a foreign country j for firm i in 
year t divided by the total number of patents granted to all 
countries for firm i in year t; 
RDIj,t = a measure of the R&D tax incentives available for country j in 
year t; 
ALLOCi,t = a continuous measure of the effect of the R&D allocation rules on 
the marginal benefit of domestic R&D deductions with zero 
equaling no effect and one equaling maximum impact; 
FTRi,t = the foreign corporate tax rate; 
FTCi,t = 1 if firm i is in an excess foreign tax credit position and zero if 
firm i is in a deficit foreign tax credit position in year t; 
I_Indexj,t = the Innovation Index as developed by Porter and Stern (1999); 
RDWagej,t = the natural logarithm of R&D wages in US$ of engineers of 
comparable qualifications in the jth country; 
FSRi,t = the ratio of foreign sales to worldwide sales for firm i in year t; 
Qi,t = the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q measured as a firm’s market 
value of assets over book value of assets; 
ROAi,t = the pre-R&D return on assets for firm i in year t; 
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CITESi,t = the average number of patent citations for firm i in year t less 
average number of citations in the industry for firm i; 
InvMillsi,t = Inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage of the Heckman (1979) 
two-step estimation;  
YEARt = a vector of year-specific indicator variables; and 
INDi =  a vector of industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 
industries. 
 
The subscripts i, j, and t refer to firm, country, and year, respectively.   
 As described in the previous section, PATENT% captures the percentage of 
innovative activities a firm has in a foreign country.   PATENT% is restricted to being 
greater than zero. 
4.3.1 Tax variables 
The R&D tax incentives provided by foreign countries discussed in Hypothesis 1 
is measured using RDI.  The R&D tax incentives may take a variety of forms, making 
international comparison difficult.  The B-Index, developed by Warda (1996), is a 
method of measuring the attractiveness of R&D tax systems among jurisdictions.  The B-
Index is a composite index calculated as the present value of income before taxes 
required to cover the initial investment in R&D and the corporate income taxes (See 
Appendix B for further details).  Algebraically, the B-index is the ratio of the after-tax 
cost of US$1 of R&D divided by 1 less the corporate income tax rate where the after-tax 
cost is the net cost of investing in R&D, taking into account all available tax incentives 
(corporate tax rates, R&D tax credits and allowances, and depreciation rates).
16
  In my 
regression model, RDI captures the expected net present value of the tax incentives 
available for the R&D activities which is RDI from the B-Index calculation outlined in 
                                                 
16
 For complete description of the B-Index, refer to Warda (1996). 
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Appendix B.  A higher RDI value reflects larger R&D tax incentives.  Therefore, I expect 
the coefficient on RDI to be positive in accordance with Hypothesis 1. 
The effect of U.S. R&D allocation rules on the marginal tax benefit of domestic 
R&D expenditures is measured by the variable, ALLOC.  The calculation of ALLOC 
follows a similar calculation used to measure the marginal tax benefit of domestic interest 
deductions by Collins and Shackelford (1992) and Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001).  
ALLOC is a continuous measure equal to zero if there is no effect (i.e. the allocation rules 
do not change the marginal tax benefit of the domestic R&D expenditures) and one if 
there is a maximum effect (i.e. the marginal tax benefit of a domestic R&D expenditure is 
zero).   I predict a positive relation between PATENT% and ALLOC as U.S. 
multinationals have incentives to locate innovative activities in foreign locations if the 
foreign tax credit limitations impair their ability to use domestic R&D expenditures. 
A detailed calculation of the effect of allocation rules on the marginal tax benefit 
of domestic R&D expenditures is outlined in Appendix A.  If a corporation is in a deficit 
foreign tax credit position (Case A in appendix A), there is no effect on the tax benefit of 
domestic R&D expenditures.  In this situation, ALLOC is coded as zero.  I also code 
ALLOC as zero if a firm pays no foreign income taxes or if a firm has worldwide losses 
and pays no U.S. taxes.  For corporations in an excess foreign tax credit position (Case 
C), I code ALLOC as one if domestic-source income is negative and there is positive 
worldwide income.  Otherwise, ALLOC equals 50 per cent of the ratio of foreign to 
worldwide sales based on the R&D allocation rules (Case B).  Firms also have the option 
of determining the allocation of R&D between foreign and domestic source based on 
gross income.   I decided to use only the foreign sales ratio in the calculation of ALLOC 
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as more firms reported foreign sales than foreign gross income.  However, recalculating 
ALLOC based on the ratio of foreign to worldwide gross income or based on the optimal 
choice of the firm between the two alternatives does not alter the results.    
I measure the multinational income shifting tax incentives using the variable FTR 
which is defined as the foreign corporate tax rate.   I use two alternative measures of the 
foreign corporate tax rate.  First, I simply use the statutory foreign country corporate tax 
rate.  In this case, FTR is equal to the sum of each country’s top national and local tax 
rates.
17
  However, this approach can be problematic as it does not capture any firm-
specific variation in marginal tax rates within a country.  In addition, it does not capture 
any special tax breaks for income related to research and development.  As an alternative, 
following Kemsley (1998), Collins et al. (1998), Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), Mills 
and Newberry (2004) and others, I use the firm-specific average foreign tax rate which is 
calculated as the total current plus deferred foreign taxes divided by total foreign pretax 
income.
18
  This firm-specific average foreign tax rate provides a proxy of a 
multinational’s worldwide mix of tax rates based on it current mix of foreign operations.  
Klassen and Laplante (2008) suggest that by considering a corporation’s mix of foreign 
tax rates based on current foreign operations may “allow the researcher to anticipate the 
tax benefit of shifting the next dollar to the optimal location” (p.10), assuming that the 
mix does not change with the additional tax planning activities.   However, as discussed 
by Mills and Newberry (2004), using the average foreign tax rate is limited as “it is a 
                                                 
17
 The statutory tax rates are from Devereux et al. (2002).  The statutory tax rates for Denmark, Korea and 
Mexico were not available and so, these rates were obtained from Corporate Taxes – A Worldwide 
Summary by Price Waterhouse. 
18
 A more recent working paper by Klassen and Laplante (2008) use the average foreign tax rate over time 
rather than an annual specification because firms are more likely to respond to the expected or typical 
foreign tax rate, especially for long-term decisions such as the decision on where to locate innovative 
activities. In addition, the ability to carry-over foreign tax credits suggests a multi-year calculation.  In 
sensitivity analyses, I will include this alternative specification for the average foreign tax rate. 
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broad tax position measure that does not lend itself to specific inferences regarding where 
the next dollar of income will be placed” (p. 95).   
The foreign tax credit position of the firm is captured using the variable FTC.  If 
the multinational is in an excess foreign tax credit position (i.e. average FTRi,t > tUS), then 
FTC is equal to one, and if the multinational is in a deficit foreign tax credit position (i.e. 
average FTRi,t < tUS), FTC is equal to zero.  According to Hypothesis 3, I expect that 
interaction FTR to be negatively related to a multinational’s incentive to innovative in a 
foreign country only if the corporation is in an excess foreign tax credit position; thus I 
predict that the coefficient on FTR*FTC is negative.  According to Hypothesis 4, I 
predict that U.S. multinationals with average foreign tax rates that are less than the U.S. 
tax rate (i.e. in a deficit foreign tax credit position) will not be influenced by the foreign 
corporate rate and so I have no prediction regarding the coefficient on FTR.         
4.3.2 Non-tax Control Variables  
4.3.2.1 Firm-level Variables 
 I include FSR to control for the proportion of the corporation’s total sales that are 
derived in foreign markets as in previous research (Mansfield et al., 1979; Vines and 
Moore, 1996; Hines and Jaffe, 2001).  I expect a positive relation between FSR and the 
choice of whether to innovate in the U.S. or in a foreign country because as the 
percentage of foreign sales increases, the firm is more global in nature and management, 
making it more likely that R&D will be performed offshore to serve the foreign markets. 
 Both Tobin’s q (Q) and pre-R&D return on assets (ROA) are included as control 
variables following previous firm-level studies on R&D expenditures and the U.S. R&D 
tax credit (Berger, 1993; Gupta et al., 2004; Klassen et al., 2004; and Brown et al, 2008).   
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Tobin’s q is a common measure of a firm’s investment opportunities or stock of 
intangible assets and is generally estimated as the market-to-book value of a firm.  
Holding the degree of foreign activity constant, firms with greater value of intangible 
assets (i.e. greater value of q) may be concerned with having valuable intangible assets 
close to home and so, may do less R&D activities offshore.  Thus, I include the natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s q (Q) as a control and predict a negative coefficient on Q.  ROA 
measures a firm’s profitability before R&D expenditures and is measured as net income 
before R&D divided by total assets.  I expect firms that are more profitable to be more 
likely to go abroad.   
 One of the drawbacks of patent data is that the innovations patented may differ 
greatly in their economic significance as discussed by Hall et al. (2005).   I control for the 
economic significance of a corporation’s patent portfolio by including CITES in my 
empirical model.  This variable measures the difference between a corporation’s average 
citations on its patent portfolio and the industry average of citations.  A citation of a prior 
patent implies that the current patent has built on previously existing knowledge 
represented by the prior patent over which the current patent cannot have a claim.
19
   
Thus, the citations serve to limit the scope of the property rights awarded by the patent.  
Patent citations appear on the front page of the public patent document issued by the 
patent office and are determined by the inventor’s attorney or patent office examiners.   
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 Citation counts suffer from a truncation problem as described by Hall et al. (2005).  Patents continue to 
receive citations over long periods of time but the database only contains citations up to the last year of 
available data.  Hall at al. (2005) address this problem by estimating the shape of the citation-lag 
distribution.  Based on this distribution, they estimate that total citations of any patent for which only a 




Evidence of the patent citations being indicators of economic impact or value of 
patents has been provided in the economic literature.  (Harhoff et al, 1999; Hirschey et al. 
2001, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; and Hall et al., 2005).  Following this literature, 
I include patent citations as a proxy for the economic value of the corporation’s patent 
portfolio.  The direction of the coefficient on CITES is ambiguous as it may be positive if 
firms are only willing to invest the time and cost to move R&D offshore if it is 
economically significant or it may be negative if firms prefer to keep significant 
innovations close to home.  
The persistence of innovations in a particular country is not included as a control.  
The firm-level and country-level variables included in the analysis are relatively stable 
over time and so the factors that would have influenced the original decision to locate in a 
particular country will be similar to the decision to locate the new R&D activities.  As a 
result, I do not include the lag of innovative activities in my regression.  
Finally, I include industry and year indicator variables to control for possible 
differences in the choice to locate R&D activities in a foreign country across industries 
and time. 
4.3.2.2 Country-Level Variables 
There are many features of a foreign country that may attract the R&D activities 
of a U.S. MNC.    I capture the overall innovative environment of a country by using the 
Innovation Index (I_Index) developed by Porter and Stern (1999) and Furman et al. 
(2002).  The index is the weighted sum of the following country-level factors:  total 
personnel employed in R&D, total R&D expenditures, the strength of protection for 
intellectual property, the percentage of GDP spent on higher education, a nations’ GDP 
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per capita, a nations GDP, the percentage of R&D expenditures funded by private 
industry, the concentration of patents across broad technological areas, and the 
percentage of R&D performed by universities (Gans and Stern, 2003).
20
  The weights 
were determined through a regression analysis of these factors on a national measure of 
innovative output (“international” patenting per capita).  The Index has been calculated 
using 29 OECD countries from 1980 to 2000.   The Innovation Index is a quantitative 
measure of a country’s ability to produce innovative output.  A higher index indicates that 
a country has a more attractive innovation environment.  Thus, I anticipate a positive 
relation between PATENT% and I_Index.   
Although including multiple country factors in the single composite measure, 
I_Index, reducing the potential collinearity found in the country-level variables, the index 
can present other problems for the empirical analysis.  Potentially, the effect of each 
factor may cancel out each other, reducing the variation captured by the index. Thus, as a 
specification check in Chapter 6, I re-estimate equation (7) with country factors included 
separately rather than as part of the I_Index.  
Although the Innovation Index includes many country factors that impact 
innovation, it does not consider the relative cost of R&D for each country.  Following 
Kumar (2001), the cost of R&D is proxied by the relative cost of hiring an engineer of 
comparable qualification in the country (RDwage).  I obtain data on R&D wages in US$ 
from Price and Earnings around the Globe published by the Union Bank of Switzerland.   
Countries with higher levels of R&D wages and so, R&D activities are more expensive, 
are less likely to attract innovative activities from US MNCs. 
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4.3.3 Selectivity Bias   
Investigating the determinants of a firm’s decision to locate innovative activities 
in a foreign location is problematic because the analysis omits firms with only domestic 
innovations, creating a potential selection bias in the regression tests.  As a result, I 
control for the self selection bias using the Heckman (1979) two-step estimation 
approach.  In the first step, I estimate the selection model where the firms chose between 
performing their innovative activities in a foreign location or solely in a domestic 
location.  From the selection model, I extract the inverse Mills’ ratio, InvMillsi,t, and 
include this variable in estimating equation (7) to control for the effects of selection.  I 
define the selection model for the first-stage of the Heckman as follows:  
ABROADi,t = 0 + 1ALLOCi,t + 2FSRi,t +  3ROAi,t + 4LnTAi,t + 5RDIntensityi,t  
+ 6CITESi,t + ∑7YEARt + ∑8INDi + i,t    (8)  
where:  
ABROADi,t = 1 if firm i has foreign R&D activity in year t and zero, otherwise; 
ALLOCi,t = a continuous measure of the effect of the foreign tax credit 
limitation on the marginal benefit of domestic R&D deductions 
with zero equaling no effect and one equaling maximum effect; 
FSRi,t = the ratio of foreign sales to worldwide total sales; 
ROAi,t = the pre-R&D return on assets; 
LnTAi,t = the logarithm of total worldwide assets; 
RDIntensityi,t 
= the ratio of research and development expenses to worldwide 
sales; 
CITESi,t = the average number of patent citations for firm i in year t, less 
average # of citations in industry for firm i;  
YEARt = a vector of year-specific indicator variables; and 





The subscripts i and t refer to firm and year, respectively.   
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ABROAD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has foreign innovative 
activities and zero, otherwise.  The firm-level explanatory variables in equation (8) 
include ALLOC, FSR, ROA, CITES, YEAR and IND  which are all included in the primary 
empirical model specified in equation (7) and are measured as describe above.   
 As outlined by Heckman (2000), Puhani (2000), and Francis and Lennox (2008), 
to successful identify selectivity, the model must have “exclusion restrictions.”  These 
exclusion restrictions refer to having at least one variable in the selection equation that 
does not influence the dependent variable in the second-stage equation.  According to 
Puhani (2000), failure to implement these exclusion restrictions can result in severe 
multicollinearity problems in the regression.  Thus, I include two firm-level variables, 
lnTA and RDIntensity that effect the decision of whether to go abroad (selection model) 
but should not effect the percentage of R&D activity in a specific foreign location (main 
model).  First, I include lnTA as a control for size.  Larger firms are expected to have 
access to more resources to be able to move R&D abroad and so, be more likely to move 
R&D activities abroad.  However, once abroad, the decision of where to locate the R&D 
should not depend on the size of the firm. Secondly, I expect firms with greater R&D 
intensity, RDIntensity, to be more likely to locate abroad.  However, once the decision 
has been made to go abroad, I don’t expect firms with greater R&D intensity to differ 
from firms with lower R&D intensity in their decisions on the percentage of R&D 
activity performed in a specific foreign location.
22
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To explore the effect of tax incentives on the location decision for R&D activities, 
I include all U.S. firms with foreign sales and tax information available in the 2007 
Compustat database and with patenting data from the USPTO during the sample period of 
1986 to 2000.
23
  The sample was restricted to include the U.S. multinationals with 
patenting in at least one foreign country.  As a result, the final sample used to estimate 
equation (7) includes 3,948 observations for 413 firms in 20 OECD countries.    
Unfortunately, the B-Index is not calculated for each OECD country and so, limited the 
number of countries included in the sample.  The sample used to estimate the selection 
model specified in equation (8) includes the sample described above and U.S. MNCs with 
patents granted only in the United States.  This sample includes 6,708 observations for 
917 firms.  
Table 3 provides industry, time-period and country descriptions of these two 
samples of observations over the period 1986 to 2000.  Panel A presents industry 
classifications using the Fama-French industry definitions.  The two largest industry 
groups in my main sample used to estimate equation (7) are Business Equipment
24
 with 
33.9% of the observations; and Manufacturing
25
 with 23.5% of the observations.   The 
distribution of the selection model sample is quite similar.  The breakdown of the sample 
by year is presented in panel B.  The observations for the two samples are fairly evenly 
spread over the sample period.  
                                                 
23
 Although the patent database includes patenting activity up to 2002, the sample period does not extend 
beyond 2000 due to the average 2 year lag between the patent application and the grant date.  Therefore, for 
the last two years of data, the database includes only a small fraction of the patents applied for that will 
eventually be granted. 
24
 Includes Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 
25
 Includes Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture, Paper and Printing 
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Panel C of Table 3 shows the allocation of the observations from the main sample 
between the 20 OECD countries.  The countries with the largest patenting activity by 
U.S. firms in my sample include Great Britain with 18.1%, Germany with 13.0%, Canada 
with 12.3%, Japan with 11.0%, and France with 10.3%.  This concentration of foreign 
patenting in a relatively small number of countries is not unexpected and is also outlined 
by Hines and Jaffe (2001). 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
In this Chapter, I discuss an empirical model for testing the four hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter 3 related to the location of innovative activities.  First, I describe how 
the dependent variable, PATENT%, will be measured using data on patenting.  Then, I 
specify a regression model that explains how U.S. MNCs decide where to locate their 
R&D activities using both tax and non-tax variables.  The explanatory variables include 
both firm and country-level factors relevant to the location decision.  To control for the 
potential selectivity bias in my sample, I use the Heckman (1979) two-step estimation 
procedure where I extract the inverse mills ratio from an estimation of a selection model.  
The inverse mills ratio (InvMills) is then include in the primary regression model as a 
control for selectivity.  The main sample used to estimate the regression model includes 
3,948 observations from 413 firms while the selection model sample includes 6,708 
observations from 917 firms.  The following chapter presents the results from estimating 
the empirical model using the sample specified. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results from the estimation of the 
empirical model specified in equation (7) using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure.  
Section 5.2 examines the relationship between patenting and R&D expenditures.  Section 
5.3 provides the univariate analysis while section 5.3 presents the multivariate results.  
Section 5.4 summarizes the chapter. 
5.2 Relationship between R&D Expenditures and Patents 
Before examining the results for the empirical model, I first verify the relationship 
between R&D expenditures and patents.  Based on the sample of firms with patenting 
activities, either domestic or foreign, described in Section 4.5, the correlation between the 
R&D and total patents in all countries is 0.708.  Following Hines and Jaffe (2001), I 
further examine of the firm-level relationship between R&D and patents by regressing the 
log of total patents on the log of R&D expenditures.  The regression results are reported 
in Table 4.  Consistent with Hines and Jaffe (2001), I find a strong positive relationship 
between R&D expenditures and patents in column (1) of Table 4.  Column (2) of Table 4 
includes the log of total assets to control for size and the results indicate that the strong 
relationship between R&D and patents remains even after controlling for size.  
5.3 Univariate Analysis 
 Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the firms with foreign R&D activities 
for the period 1986 to 2000.  The mean (median) value for the dependent variable, 
PATENT%, is 0.087 (0.022) indicating that on average, U.S. MNCs  firms are placing 
less than 10% of their innovative activities in one foreign country.  This is consistent with 
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statistics reported by Hines (2001) that U.S. firms overall foreign activity of about 10%.  
The mean (median) of RDI is 0.383 (0.384) suggesting that firms are innovating in 
foreign countries that offer some tax incentives for R&D activities.  The U.S. R&D 
allocation rules have some effect on average with a mean (median) value of 0.123 
(0.000).  The statistics indicate that the mean (median) average foreign tax rate is 0.327 
(0.346) while the foreign corporate statutory tax rate is 0.398 (0.360).  It appears that U.S. 
firms are innovating in foreign countries with statutory rates that are higher than the firm-
specific average foreign tax rates face by these firms.     
 In Table 6, I report the Pearson correlation coefficients between the regression 
variables.  As expected, the variables RDI and I_Index are positively correlated with the 
dependent variable while the interaction of FTR and FTC, RDWage, Q, and CITES are all 
negatively correlated.  Although the correlation between the PATENT% and each of the 
variables ALLOC, FSR and ROA is expected to be positive, the correlation between 
PATENT% and each of these variables is surprisingly negative.   
 The correlations between the explanatory variables reported in Table 6 are 
important to note. The inverse mills ratio (InvMills) that is extracted from the selection 
model is highly correlated with several firm-level variables included in equation (7).  For 
example, the correlation between InvMills and FSR is -0.506 and between InvMills and 
ROA is -0.240.  The high correlation is not unexpected as both FSR and ROA are also 
included in the selection model.  However, this highlights the importance of checking for 
the potential impact of multicollinearity from the use of the Heckman (1979) two-step 
estimation approach on the estimations from the main empirical model.  There is also 
high correlation between ALLOC, FTR, and FTC and between I_Index and RDWage. 
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Comparative descriptive statistics between firms with foreign R&D activities and 
firms with only domestic R&D activities are presented in Table 7.  The differences in 
mean values between the two samples are statistically significant at the 1% level for all of 
the explanatory variables except for the R&D Intensity ratio (RDIntensity) which is not 
statistically different between the two samples.  Thus, U.S. MNCs with foreign R&D 
activities are generally larger with a higher mean value for the natural logarithm of total 
assets (LnTA), more profitable with higher mean ROA and have higher foreign sales-to-
worldwide sales ratio (FSR).  In addition, firms with foreign R&D activities appear to be 
impacted more by the R&D allocation rules as indicated by the significantly higher value 
of ALLOC.  Finally, the economic significance of a firm’s patent portfolio as measured 
by CITES is significantly different between the two samples of firms. 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis             
The results of estimating the regression specified in equation (7), using the 
Heckman two-stage procedure, are provided in Table 8.  The regression estimates in 
column (1) represent the results using the average foreign tax rate as a proxy for the 
foreign corporate tax rate and column (2) represents the results using the statutory foreign 
tax rate.  Since the estimates are generally consistent between the two columns except for 
the variables related to the foreign tax rate, I focus the discussion solely on the estimates 
provided by column (1).  The differences between the two columns in the estimates of the 
tax variables are further discussed below.  
The response of U.S. MNCs to the R&D tax incentives is represented by the 
coefficient on RDI. RDI is a measure of the tax incentives available for R&D activities 
provided by each country.  As predicted by Hypothesis 1, U.S. MNCs in this sample 
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appear to locate more innovative activities in foreign countries that offer larger R&D tax 
incentives as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on RDI.  The coefficient 
on R&D tax incentive variable is 0.082 and statistically significant at the 5% level using a 
one-tailed test.  This suggests that on average, a foreign country can attract R&D 
activities from U.S. MNCs by increasing the R&D tax incentives provided.   To illustrate, 
suppose the value of RDI increased by 0.1.  The value of RDI could increase by this 
amount if Canada, for example, extended the enhanced R&D tax credit, currently 
available to smaller Canadian controlled private corporations, to foreign-controlled 
corporations.  This would increase the R&D tax credit available to foreign-controlled 
corporations from 20% to 35%, leading to an increase in the value of RDI for Canada 
from 0.437 to 0.537.  Therefore, holding everything else constant, if the average value of 
RDI increased by 0.1, the percentage of foreign patenting by U.S. MNCs would increase 
by 9.4%.
26
  This implies a foreign country can increase the patenting activity from U.S. 
multinationals by providing a more generous tax credit. 
The effects of the U.S. R&D allocation rules are captured by the variable ALLOC. 
According to Hypothesis 2, ALLOC is expected to have positive impact on the foreign 
activities of a U.S. MNCs.  As expected, the coefficient on ALLOC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level using a one-tailed test (z-statistic = 1.98).  This 
indicates that U.S. allocation rules for domestic R&D expenditures have some impact on 
the decision on whether the U.S. MNC innovates in a foreign country.  
The income shifting incentives outlined in Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are 
measured using the foreign tax rate (FTR), the foreign tax credit position (FTC) and the 
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 Calculated as the change in average RDI value (0.1) multiplied by the estimated coefficient (0.082) 
divided by the average foreign patenting percentage (0.087) 
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interaction of these two variables.  Based on Hypothesis 3, where the foreign tax rate 
increases, U.S. MNCs in excess foreign tax credit positions (i.e. FTC=1) will be less 
likely to innovate in a foreign country.  The coefficient on the interaction of FTR and 
FTC tests this hypothesis.  Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the negative coefficient on 
FTR*FTC that is significant at the 1% level reported in column (1) of Table 8 indicates 
that U.S. MNCs in excess foreign tax credit positions appear to respond to the incentive 
to shift income into the U.S. by decreasing R&D activities outside the U.S. as foreign tax 
rates rise.   On the other hand, U.S. MNCs in a deficit foreign tax credit position are not 
expected to be effected by the foreign tax rate as specified in Hypothesis 4.  Contrary to 
this hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on FTR is positive (0.108) and significant at the 
1% level.  This suggests that these U.S. MNCs will locate more innovative activities in a 
foreign country as the tax rate increases.  Klassen and Laplante (2008) posit that the 
proxy for income shifting, an annual average foreign tax rate, used by Collins et al. 
(1998) and others is flawed and that a more appropriate measure would consider a multi-
year approach.  In specification analysis, I employ a multi-year measure to investigate the 
sensitivity of my findings to the measure of the average foreign tax rate.  Another 
possible explanation is that the royalty payment for use of U.S. innovations outside the 
U.S. is not fixed.  The model in Chapter 3 assumes that a market rate of royalties, R, is 
always fixed.  However, if the royalty is flexible, then undertaking R&D in the U.S. 
increases future profit-shifting flexibility.  The benefit of this flexibility increases as the 
foreign rate declines for deficit foreign tax credit firms. 
In contrast to the results in column (1) of Table 8, I do not find income shifting 
incentive effects when the U.S. multinationals’ income shifting incentive are measured 
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using the country statutory tax rate in column (2).  For both FTR and the interaction of 
FTR and FTC, the estimated coefficients are highly insignificant when FTR is measured 
using the country statutory tax rate.  As previously discussed, this measure is problematic 
as it does not consider the multinationals worldwide operations and potential access to 
other tax haven jurisdictions (Mills and Newberry, 2004).  Also, since the effect of 
foreign tax rates works through the company’s foreign tax credit position, the tax rate for 
the country of innovation is weakly related to the company’s tax position.  The 
correlation between the average foreign tax rate and the country statutory tax rate is only 
0.11 for my sample.  In addition, the country statutory tax rate is the rate applied to the 
top income bracket and may not accurately reflect the actual tax rate faced by U.S. 
multinationals on income from R&D activities in the foreign country.  The insignificant 
results using the foreign statutory corporate tax rate suggests that for the decision on 
where to locate innovative activities, firms may not rely on the country’s foreign 
corporate tax rate, but use the average foreign tax rate. 
The remaining results reported in Table 8 are for the control variables included in 
the regression model.  The country-level control variables include the I_Index, a measure 
of a country’s innovative capacity, and RDwage, a measure controlling for the cost of 
R&D.  As expected, the coefficient on I_Index is positive at 0.035 and significant at the 
5% level while the coefficient on RDwage is negative (-0.042) and significant at the 5% 
level.   The firm-level control variables include the foreign sales ratio (FSR), Tobin’s q 
(Q), and the average citations (CITES).  FSR is positive and significant at the 1% level 
while both Q and CITES are negative and significant at the 1% level.  The negative and 
significant coefficient on Q, the control for the stock of intangibles, suggests that firms 
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with higher valued intangibles are less likely to innovate in a foreign country.  Similarly, 
the estimated  negative coefficient on CITES, the control for the economic significance of 
a firm’s patents, indicates that corporations are less willing to move economically 
significant innovations offshore and prefer to keep it close to home. 
5.4.1 Selectivity Bias  
I control for the potential selectivity bias in my sample by including the inverse 
mills ratio, InvMills in equation (7).  InvMills is extracted from the estimate of the 
selection model specified in equation (8).  The results of this estimation are reported in 
Table 9.   Estimates of the coefficients for the explanatory variables in equation (8) are all 
positive and significant at the 1% level as expected.  The coefficient on InvMills is 0.267 
and is significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test.  This provides evidence that the 
selection bias is important and should be included in equation (7). 
5.4.2 Multicollinearity 
A concern with the Heckman (1979) two-step approach is the potentially severe 
multicollinearity due to the inclusion of similar variables in both the selection equation 
and main equation (Puhani, 2000 and Francis and Lennox, 2008).  The potential 
multicollinearity may be reduced by including “exclusion restrictions.”  To investigate 
the influence of multicollinearity on my results, I compute the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for the variables in equation (7).   The VIFs measure the increase in the variance 
of a coefficient that results from collinearity (Greene, 2005).  Generally, multicollinearity 
is seen as high (very high) when VIFs exceed 10 (20).   For the explanatory variables in 
equation (7), the VIFs are report in Table 10.  The potential multicollinearity in the 
equation (7) as a result of estimating the equation using the Heckman (1979) two-step 
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approach appears to be low based on the VIF of 2.22 reported for the inverse mills ratio 
(InvMills).  Thus, using exclusion restrictions appears to have been effective in reducing 
the effect of potential multicollinearity from the Heckman (1979) two-step approach.   
The remaining VIFs reported in Table 10 are generally less than 2 except for the 
variables FTR, FTC and their interaction which have higher VIFs of 4.02, 11.98 and 
16.92, respectively.  Although higher, the VIFs on these variables are still below the 
threshold of 20 above which multicollinearity is deemed to be very high. The higher VIFs 
on these variables are to be expected due to the interaction of the two variables.  
Recalculating the VIFs without including the interaction of FTR and FTC reduces the 
VIFs on these two variables to 2.42 and 2.94, respectively.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The results reported in this chapter suggest that U.S. multinationals are influenced 
by the R&D tax incentives provided by foreign countries.  In addition, evidence suggests 
that the U.S. R&D allocation rules have a positive impact on the percentage of innovative 
activities that firms locate in a foreign country.  Finally, the income shifting incentive 
also appears to be influential on the location decision.  U.S. multinationals in excess 
foreign tax credit positions are less likely to locate innovative activities in a foreign 
country as the tax rate increases.  On the other hand, firms in deficit foreign tax credit 
positions are more likely to move innovative activities offshore as the tax rate increases.  
In the following chapter, I perform a series of specification checks to investigate the 
robustness of these results. 
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CHAPTER 6: SPECIFICATION ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the results from performing a series of specification checks 
on the main results reported in Chapter 5.  For the specification checks, the estimations of 
the selection model of the Heckman (1979) two-step approach are generally similar to the 
main results in Chapter 5 and are not reported unless the results vary significantly from 
those reported in Chapter 5.  Section 6.2 discusses the results of re-estimating equation 
(7) using alternative measures of the explanatory variables.  Section 6.3 provides results 
using different estimation approaches and section 6.4 provides results from alternative 
model specifications to address multicollinearity issues.  Section 6.5 outlines the results 
of changing the sample used in the main empirical investigation and Section 6.6 
addresses the potential dependence of observations over time.  Section 6.7 discusses the 
ALLOC variable and Section 6.8 concludes. 
6.2 Alternative Measures of Explanatory Variables 
6.2.1 R&D Tax Incentives 
The R&D tax incentives provided by each country may take a variety of forms 
and so, creating a measure for international comparison is difficult.  The main results 
reported in Chapter 5 were estimated using a component used to calculate the B-Index 
developed by Warda (1996).  The B-Index has also been used to compare the 
international R&D tax incentives in studies by Guellec et al. (2003) and Falk (2006).  
Bloom et al. (2002) develop an alternative measure to the B-Index for international 
comparison.  Similar to the B-Index, Bloom et al. (2002) combine tax rates, depreciation 
allowances and integration of personal and corporate income taxes to measure a “tax 
61 
 
cost” (Bloom) of R&D across countries and time.  They derived their measure of the 
R&D incentives for nine countries,
27
 including the United States from 1979 to 1997.   
Since this measure was available for fewer countries and did not cover all the years of my 
sample, the measure was not used in the main regression analysis.   For comparison 
purposes, I estimate the regression model using the smaller sample using both the RDI 
and RDI_Bloom in reporting the results in Table 11.  RDI_Bloom is measured as [1 – 
Bloom(1– t)] to be consistent with the measurement of RDI.  The correlation of the RDI 
and RDI_Bloom is 0.8564 suggesting that the two measures are quite similar.  Reviewing 
the results of estimating equation (7) using RDI_Bloom reveals that its positive and 
significant coefficient at the 10% level is consistent with the main results that higher 
R&D tax incentives attract R&D activity from U.S. MNCs.  The positive and significant 
coefficient of RDI on the smaller sample also confirms the previous conclusions.     
6.2.2 Income Shifting Incentives 
Although the estimated coefficient on the average foreign tax rate (FTR) was 
predicted to be insignificant according to Hypothesis 4, the estimated coefficient is 
significantly positive.  A potential explanation for this counter-intuitive result is that my 
measure of FTR is inappropriate.  Although the most common method of calculating FTR 
has been an annual average, Klassen and Laplante (2008) suggest that a multi-year 
approach is more appropriate as planning to income shift is usually a multi-period 
consideration and so, income shifting behavior and income shifting incentives should be 
measured over multiple periods.  Income shifting may be considered over multi-periods 
rather than annually because multi-jurisdictional income shifting can create significant 
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transaction costs and changes in earnings patterns can be a signal to tax administrators.  
In addition, foreign tax credits have multi-year carry-over provisions so incentives 
created by fluctuating foreign tax rates are smoothed across years.  Using a multi-period 
approach, Klassen et al. (2008) demonstrate that by using an annual average foreign tax 
rate, a positive association can be found between the foreign tax rate and foreign profit 
margin but if the foreign tax rate is calculated using a multi-period approach the 
association is negative.  Thus, my main results may be sensitive to how the foreign tax 
rate is measured. 
Based on Klassen et al. (2008), I re-estimate the foreign tax rate using a multi-
period perspective as follows: 
 
tFTR  =  
where IT is the foreign tax expense and PFI is the pre-tax foreign income.  tFTR  
is initially calculated using a 5-year moving average where firms must have at least 3 
years of data to calculate the average. I also calculate tFTR using a 3-year moving 
average where firms must have at least 2 years of data.   Incorporating a multi-period 
approach, the regression model in equation (7) is modified as follows: 
PATENT%i,j,t = 0 + 1 RDI j,t + 2 ALLOC i,t + 3 FTR i,t + 4 FTC i,t + 5 FTR i,t* FTC i,t  
+ 6 IndexI _ j,t + 7 RDWage j,t + 8 FSR i,t + 9 Q i,t  + 10 ROA i,t 
+11CITESi,t + 12InvMillsi,t + ∑13YEARt + ∑14INDi + i,j,t    (9) 
 
and the selection model is: 
ABROADi,t = 0 + 1 ALLOC i,t + 2 FSR i,t + 3 ROA i,t + 4 LnTA i,t   




















The variables in equation (9) and (10) are as previously defined in Chapter 5 but 
averaged over 5 or 3 years except PATENT%, ABROAD and CITES.  PATENT% is not 
averaged over 5 or 3 years in the regression model as patents represent the culmination of 
R&D activity performed in the past and thus, is measured annually.  CITES is also 
measured annually as it is a variable that is directly related the patents.  ABROAD is 
calculated directly from PATENT% and therefore, is also measured annually. 
The results for estimated the modified equation are tabulated in columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 12.  Column (1) reports the 5-year average and column (2) reports the 3-year 
average.  Despite the changes in the definition of the foreign tax rate variable, the 
conclusions remain consistent with the main results.  Firms in deficit foreign tax credit 
positions still appear to increase their innovative activities with an increase in the average 
foreign tax rate while firms in excess foreign tax credit positions decrease their foreign 
innovative activities as the average foreign tax rate increases.    For both the 5-year 
average and 3-year average, the coefficient on FTR increases from the main results in 
magnitude and significance.  The coefficient on the interaction of FTR and FTC is fairly 
similar to the main results for the 3-year average estimations but for the 5-year estimation 
the magnitude is not quite as negative as the main results and also has a lower z-statistic. 
  The statistical significance of the coefficients generally declines from the 3-year 
moving average estimates to the 5-year estimates.  Particularly, in the 5-year estimation, 
ALLOC is no longer statistically significant.  A potential explanation for the overall 
decline in the statistical significance is that R&D projects are generally carried out over a 
period shorter than 5 years and so, estimating the regression model using 3-year moving 
averages reflects more closely a shorter decision period for R&D locations. 
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Table 13 reports the estimation of the selection model.  The results for the 3-year 
estimates are generally similar to those reported for the main results in Table 6.  But, for 
the 5-year estimates, the estimations of ALLOC and RDIntensity are now insignificant. 
6.2.3 Country-level Control Variables 
The overall innovative environment of a country is captured by the Innovation 
Index (I_Index) in the main regression analysis.  Using one variable to control for a 
number of factors conceals the influence of each factor and the separate effects of the 
factors may cancel each other out.  As an alternative to the I_Index, I re-estimate equation 
(7) but replace I_Index with the following country factors: 
RDPersonj,t = the natural logarithm of the aggregate personnel employed in 
R&D; 
GERDj,t =  the natural logarithm of the total R&D expenditures in Year 2000 
US$; 
IPRj,t =  the strength of protection for intellectual property for country j in 
year t; 
GDP_Capitaj,t = the natural logarithm of GDP per capita for country j in year t; 
GDPj,t = the natural logarithm of GDP in year 2000 US$ for country j in 
year t; 
IndFundj,t = R&D expenditures funded by industry divided by total R&D 
expenditures for country j in year t; and 
Specializationj,t 
= the total number of patents in ICT and BIO technology sectors for 
the jth country in year t divided by the total number patents in 
ICT and BIO technology sectors for the 20 OECD countries 
included in the sample for year t. 
 
RDPerson measures the overall supply of scientific and technically trained 
individuals available in each country while GERD is a measure of the total R&D 
expenditures for each country and captures the availability of funding for innovation-
related investments.  The strength of protection for intellectual property is measured by 
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the Ginarte-Park (1997) Index (IPR) which ranges from 0 to 5 with higher numbers 
indicating stronger protection.  GDP_Capita proxies for the living standard of a country 
while GDP captures the size of the country.  The percentage of R&D expenditures funded 
by private industry is measured by IndFund.  A higher value of IndFund is an indication 
of a more favourable innovation environment.   Specialization measures the concentration 
of patents in two technology areas, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
and Biotechnology (BIO) relative to other the other 20 OECD countries included in the 
sample.  Specialization attempts to capture the geographical clustering of these 
technology sectors and at the least provides the relative specialization of national 
economies in these two specific areas.
28
    
The estimated coefficients and z-statistics for this re-estimation are reported in 
column (1) of Table 14.  Similar to the reported results in Chapter 5 for the main 
regression, RDI, ALLOC, FTR and FTC remain positive and significant while the 
interaction of FTR and FTC is significantly negative.  The firm-level control variables 
also remain similar to previously reported results.  However, contrary to expectations, the 
estimates of the country-level control variables are mostly insignificant except for GERD.   
As is evident from the correlation table in Table 15, the country factors are highly 
correlated, particularly RDPerson, GERD and GDP which have correlation in excess of 
0.97.  The VIFs reported in Table 14 confirm that the high correlation between the 
country-level control variables is likely a problem.  RDPerson, GERD and GDP have 
VIFs of 89.58, 51.76, and 36.14, respectively which are well above the very high 
threshold of 20.  Therefore, to address this potential problem, I re-estimate the regression 
                                                 
28
 Porter and Stern (1999) and Gans and Stern (2003) use similar country factors to calculate the Innovation 
Index.  Two factors used by these studies, share of GDP spend on higher education and percentage of R&D 
performed by universities,  have not been included as consistent data was not found.  
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model with the country factors but include each of RDPerson, GERD, and GDP in 
separate equation in column (2), (3), and (4) respectively.  The VIFs reported beside the 
estimates are now well below the threshold of 20.  In each case, the conclusions related to 
the main hypotheses do not change. 
6.2.4 Lagged Variables  
As previously discuss in Chapter 4, the timing of patent activities and the decision 
on where to locate R&D activities is an important consideration for this study.  Although 
evidence suggests that the relation between R&D expenditures & patenting activity is 
close to contemporaneous, I re-estimate the Heckman (1979) two-stage model using both 
one-year and two-year lag of the variables to investigate whether my results reported in 
the previous chapter are sensitive to the when the variables are measured.  Results are 
tabulated in Table 16.  As is evident from Table 16, the re-estimation of the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage model using both a one-year and two-year lag produces coefficients for 
the variables related to my hypotheses that are fairly similar in sign, magnitude and 
significance.   One notable difference is the lack of significance on the variable ALLOC 
which measures the impact of the U.S. R&D allocation rules when measured using a one-
year lag.  Although with the correct sign, ALLOC is not significant with a z-statistic of 
1.01 using the one-year lag.  However, with a two-year lag, it is once again positively 
significant at the 5% level.   Based on this specification check, the conclusions related to 
ALLOC should be taken with some caution. 
6.3 Estimation Approach 
To test the hypotheses, equation (7) is estimated using the Heckman (1979) two-
step approach.  By applying this procedure, I control for the potential selection bias in my 
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sample.  To check if my conclusions are sensitive to this choice of procedure, I re-
estimate equation (7) using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach rather 
than the two-step procedure.  In order for the maximum likelihood to converge, ALLOC 
needed to be removed for the estimation of the selection model specified in equation (8).  
The maximum likelihood approach is sensitive to multicollinearity and has difficulty 
converging if the correlation between variables is high.  ALLOC is highly correlated with 
the variables FTR, FTC and their interaction in equation (7) and so, caused problems in 
the estimation using MLE.  Results in Table 17, column (1) are generally consistent with 
the results reported in the previous chapter except that although ALLOC is positive, it is 
no longer significant with a z-statistic of 1.22.   Table 18 reports the estimation of the 
selection model using MLE.  The estimation and significance of the variables are mostly 
similar to the results in Table 6 for the main selection model results.  One important 
difference is the estimation of RDIntensity.  In contrast to the significantly positive 
coefficient found in the main selection results, RDIntensity is significantly negative.  The 
change in the direction of RDIntensity may be a result of excluding ALLOC from the 
selection model in the MLE estimation.  
As a second alternative to the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, I estimate 
equation (7) using OLS.  By using OLS, I ignore the potential selection bias in my 
sample.  The estimated coefficients and their t-statistics are reported in column (2).  
Surprisingly, the estimated coefficients on FTR and FTC are negative while the 
coefficient on their interaction is positive.  This is opposite to the hypotheses and the 
main reported results.  However, the R
2
 is extremely low suggesting that equation (7) 
may be missing some important explanatory variables that may be correlated with the 
68 
 
independent variables.  In column (3), I re-estimate equation (7) using OLS but also 
include lnTA and RDIntensity that are included in the selection model but not the primary 
regression equation.  With the inclusion of these additional variables, the signs on FTR 
and FTC are positive while the sign on their interaction is negative, consistent with the 
main results.    
The coefficient estimates for several control variables are of concern.  In column 
(3), the estimated coefficients on lnTA and ROA are significantly negative.  FSR is also 
negative but not significant.  Each of these control variables is expected to have a positive 
influence on the foreign innovative activities of a U.S. MNC.  These inconsistent results 
may suggest that the variables, in the absence of the selection model, are capturing 
something in addition to what was intended.  Thus, I conclude that OLS is not appropriate 
in this setting. 
6.4 Alternative Model Specifications to Address Multicollinearity 
A concern with the results reported in the previous chapter is the influence of 
multicollinearity on the results.  The analysis of the variance inflation factors of the 
explanatory variables in Table 10 revealed fairly high values for the FTR, FTC and the 
interaction of the two variables.  In addition, although the VIF on ALLOC was not high, 
the variable ALLOC is highly correlated with these tax variables.  In review of the 
correlation table in Table 6, it is evident that the variables ALLOC, FTR, FTC and the 
interaction of FTR and FTC are highly correlated: their correlation ranges from 0.466 to 
0.951.  To ensure that the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance is not 
driven by the high correlation, I re-estimate the regression equations by first eliminating 
ALLOC and second by eliminating the FTR, FTC and their interaction.  The results of 
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these two re-estimations are reported in Table 19.  The direction, estimated coefficient 
and the statistical significance of the explanatory variables are consistent with the main 
regression results.  Thus, it appears that the high correlation of the variables is not an 
important influence on the results reported in Chapter 5.  
6.5 Main results with Restricted Samples 
6.5.1 Profitable Multinationals 
The incentives for firms that are in loss positions are more difficult to define than 
profitable firms.  Therefore, following Klassen and Laplante (2008) and Collins et al. 
(1998) among others, I exclude firms with negative pretax domestic or foreign income 
from the main sample.  Based on this restriction, the observations with foreign R&D 
activity are reduced to 3,114.  Results of re-estimating the regression model on this 
restricted sample is tabulated in column (1) of Table 20.   The positive coefficient on RDI 
has a slightly stronger significance level of 1%.  The interaction of FTR and FTC remains 
significantly negative but at a slightly lower statistical level of 5%.  Lastly, the control 
variables are consistent with the estimations reported in the main results. 
However, the coefficients on ALLOC and FTR lose significance when the 
estimation is determined on the restricted sample.  For U.S. multinationals, the greatest 
influence of the U.S. R&D allocation rules (i.e. ALLOC = 1) occurs when the domestic 
source income is negative but the worldwide income is positive.   In the restricted sample, 
these firms are classified as loss firms because their domestic source income is less than 
zero. Thus, the restricted sample does not include firms for which the allocation effect is 
the strongest and so, the standard deviation of ALLOC is reduced 0.201 to 0.125.  In 
addition, the correlation between ALLOC, FTR, FTC and the interaction of FTR and FTC 
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increases with the restricted sample suggesting that multicollinearity may be causing the 
lack of results.  However, re-estimating the regression model on profitable firms but 
removing ALLOC and then removing FTR, FTC and their interaction does not alter the 
results for the profitable firms as seen in Table 20, column (2) and (3).   The coefficient 
on FTR also loses significance suggesting the profitable firms in deficit foreign tax credit 
positions do not respond by changing their foreign innovative activities as the tax rate 
changes.  Although this is consistent with my hypothesis 4, it is inconsistent with the 
main results.     
6.5.2 Main Foreign Country with R&D Activity 
The main sample may include multiple observations for one firm for any 
particular year as firms may patent in more than one country.  In my sample, firms 
innovated anywhere from one to sixteen foreign countries but on average, firms 
innovated in approximately two foreign countries.  Firms with multiple observations will 
be more heavily weighted in the empirical estimations and so, may have a stronger 
influence the results.  To investigate how multiple annual observations for a firm may 
alter the results, I restrict the sample to include only one firm observation per year.  I 
selected the firm-country observation for which the firm had the highest innovative 
activity for a particular year.  I dropped firms from the sample in cases where the highest 
innovative percentage for a firm was the same for multiple countries.  As a result, the 
main sample is reduced to 1,489 observations for 404 firms.  Generally, the results 
reported in Table 20 for the sample restricted to one firm-country observation per year 
are consistent with the main results but are stronger in significance.   Therefore, allowing 
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multiple observations for a firm to be included in my main sample does not appear to 
alter my conclusions. 
6.6 Dependence of Observations over Time 
The data used in my analysis are both time-series and cross-sectional.  A concern 
with this data is the possible dependence of errors over time and across firms.  Since the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage approach is estimated using the standard OLS and probit 
models, the error terms can be biased if residuals are correlated across observations.   I 
address this concern using two different methods.  First, I restrict my sample to one 
observation per firm.  I select the observation where the firm first entered into my sample 
resulting in a sample of 335 observations for firms with foreign R&D activities and 618 
observations for firms with domestic R&D only.  Estimates of the Heckman (1979) two-
stage approach are provided in column (1) of Table 21 and Table 22.  Consistent with the 
main results, the coefficients on FTR remains positive and significant while the 
coefficient on the interaction of FTR and FTC remains negative and significant as seen in 
Table 21.  However, the coefficients on RDI and ALLOC are now insignificant.  In 
addition, the country-level control variables, I_Index and RDWage are insignificant.  For 
the selection model in Table 22, FSR, lnTA and CITES remain significant while the 
remaining variable are now insignificant.  The change in the significance of the results 
may suggest that the dependence of the errors over time may contribute to some of the 
conclusions reported in Chapter 5.  Another possible reason for the lack of significance 
these variables may be the reduction in the number of observations.   By restricting the 
sample to include only one observation per firm, the number of observations per country 
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is greatly reduced.  This may be one reason why the coefficients on the country level 
variables (RDI, I_Index and RDWage) are now insignificant. 
Peterson (2009) suggests that one method to produce unbiased standard errors in 
data sets with error terms that are correlated both across time and across firms is by 
including dummy variables for each time period and clustering the errors by firm.  
Therefore, as a second approach, I re-estimate the main empirical model using standard 
errors that are clustered by firm since the main empirical model already includes time 
dummy variables.  Column (2) of Table 21 and Table 22 report the results from 
estimating the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach using standard errors clustered by 
firm.  The results are similar to the results reported in Chapter 5 for both the main 
empirical model and the selection model.  As seen in Table 21, the coefficients on RDI, 
ALLOC, and FTR are all positive and significant while the interaction of FTR and FTC is 
negative and significant.  The results for the selection model in Table 22 remain similar 
to the selection model results in Chapter 5.  Thus, adjusting for the dependence of the 
errors over time does not alter the results. 
6.7 ALLOC Variable 
The specification checks described above indicate that the results for the ALLOC 
variable are inconsistent and so the conclusion of a significant effect of the U.S. R&D 
allocation rules as outlined in Hypothesis 2 may not be reliable.  The inconsistent results 
may be due to a number of issues in measuring ALLOC.   First, ALLOC is not a truly 
continuous variable.  ALLOC has a large number of observations valued at zero (56 
percent) and very few observations valued at one (3 percent).  The remaining 
observations are concentrated between 0 and 0.5.  A second problem is that ALLOC is 
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highly correlated with a number of other variables including FTC, FTR and FSR.  The 
high correlation between these variables is not unexpected as they are used in the 
calculation ALLOC.   To address these problems, one alternative approach to measuring 
the ALLOC variable could be to examine each of the situations (Case A, Case B and Case 
C) described in Appendix A separately.  However, a variable representing Case A will be 
the same as the FTC variable and so I would not be able to distinguish between the 
allocation effect and the income shifting effect for firms in deficit foreign tax credit 
positions.  Thus, the effect of the R&D allocation rules can only be examined for firms in 
excess foreign tax credit positions (Case B and Case C). 
6.8 Conclusion 
The specification checks reported in this chapter suggest that the conclusions 
drawn from the main results in the previous chapter are generally robust.  Re-estimating 
the regression model using alternative measures of the R&D tax incentives, the income 
shifting incentives and the timing of the explanatory variables, different estimation 
approaches, alternative model specifications to address multicollinearity, alternative 
sample restrictions and different specifications to address the potential dependence of 
errors terms over time do not appear to significantly alter the results.  One exception is 
the results related to the U.S. R&D allocation rules as measured by ALLOC.  When using 
the lag of ALLOC, estimating the equation using MLE and restricting the sample to only 
profitable firms, ALLOC loses significance.  Thus, conclusions reached in the previous 
chapter regarding the positive influence the U.S. R&D allocation rules have on the 
foreign innovative activity of U.S. MNCs should be treated with caution. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, I investigate the association between multi-jurisdictional tax 
incentives and the location decision for R&D activities.  I specifically focus on the tax 
incentives related to R&D and income shifting.  In the analysis, I also consider the 
influence on the U.S. foreign tax credit system on these incentives.   
 I use data on patenting from the USPTO to determine the firm-level innovative 
activity in 20 OECD countries for the period 1986 to 2000.  Then, using the Heckman 
(1979) two-step estimation approach, I regress the percentage of innovative activity in 
specific foreign country on proxies for R&D tax incentives, the U.S. R&D allocation 
rules, income shifting incentives, and both firm- and country-level control variables.   
I find evidence that the percentage of foreign innovative activities is associated 
with the attractiveness of the foreign R&D tax incentives and with an increase in the 
effect of the U.S. R&D allocation rules.  In addition, the results suggest that firms in 
excess foreign tax credit positions decrease the amount of R&D activities in a foreign 
location with increasing foreign tax rates, consistent with income shifting incentives.  
However, contrary to expectations, I find a positive relation between the amount of 
foreign activities and the foreign tax rate. 
Specification tests show that the results are robust to an alternative measure for 
the country-specific R&D tax incentives, alternative measures for the income shifting 
incentives, and alternative country-level control variables.  Further tests to address the 
potential effect of the high multicollinearity and the dependence of errors over time on 
the results are also consistent with the main results reported.   
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Some caution is needed in interpreting the significant results associated with the 
U.S. R&D allocation rules.  Alternative lags for the measurement of the explanatory 
variables, alternative estimation approaches to the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, 
and restricting the sample to profitable firms generally provide results consistent with the 
main results except for the effect of the U.S. R&D allocation rules.  The significantly 
positive relation between the percentage of foreign patent activity and the allocation rules 
is not robust to the alternative specifications of a one-year lag in measurement or the 
MLE estimation approach.   
The results of this study contribute to the literature on tax incentives related to 
R&D and income shifting in several ways.  First, to my knowledge, it is the first study to 
examine and provide evidence of the influence of R&D tax incentives provided by 
foreign countries on a U.S. multinational’s decision on where to locate innovative 
activities.  As well, this study provides additional evidence related to the question of the 
effect of the U.S. R&D policies.  The evidence that the greater the effect of U.S. R&D 
allocation rules, the greater the foreign R&D activity confirms the country-level findings 
by Vines and Moore (1996) but does not support the firm-level findings by Hines and 
Jaffe (2001). 
In addition, this study is the first to investigate the role of income shifting 
incentives on the location decision of R&D.  The results suggest that the average foreign 
tax rate is more important to the location decision than the country-specific tax rate.  This 
provides new insight on the foreign corporate tax rate that a corporation relies in its 
decision to locate R&D.   The study extends the literature on multi-jurisdictional income 
shifting that has found that firms in excess foreign tax credit positions shift income into 
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the U.S. by providing evidence of the association between income shifting incentives and 
the location decision for R&D activities.  Finally, the study also offers new firm-level 
evidence on the response of firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions to shift income 
shifting incentives.  It appears that firms in deficit foreign tax credit positions move R&D 
activities offshore as the foreign tax rises.  This is consistent with the explanation that if 
the royalty payment from the foreign subsidiary to the U.S. parent is flexible, then 
undertaking R&D in the United States increase future profit-shifting flexibility.  Thus, the 
benefit of the flexibility decreases with an increase in a foreign rate decreases.   However, 




Foreign Tax Credit Limitations and the Marginal Tax Benefit of 
Domestic R&D expenditures 
 




For U.S. foreign tax credit calculations only, domestic R&D expenditures cannot be fully 
deducted against domestic source income under the U.S. allocation rules.  The current 
allocation rules were implemented with the 1995 Treasury regulations.
30
  The regulations 
specify two alternative methods of determining the allocation between domestic- and 
foreign-source income: 
 25 percent of U.S.-based R&D expenses allocated to domestic source with the 
remaining 75 percent allocated between domestic and foreign source based on 
gross income and 
 50 percent of U.S.-based R&D expenses allocated to domestic source with the 
remaining 50 percent allocated between domestic and foreign source based on 
sales. 
These R&D allocation rules change the foreign tax credit limitation by altering the 
foreign source income.  As discussed in Chapter 3, if the U.S. tax rate is tUS, the foreign 
tax credit limitation is calculated as: 
 
Foreign Tax Credit Limitation = tUS x Foreign-Source Income 
 
Based on the first allocation method, the R&D allocation regulations enter the foreign tax 
credit limitation computation by changing the foreign-source income (FSI) to [FSI – 
                                                 
29
 Similar calculations are outlined by Collins and Shackelford (1992) and Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) 
to determine the impact of foreign tax credit limitations on the marginal benefit of domestic interest 
allocations. 
30
 See Hines and Jaffe (2001) for a detailed history of the allocation rules. 
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0.75*(FI/WI) * R&D] where FI/WI is the ratio of foreign to worldwide gross income, and 
R&D equals the amount of domestic R&D expenditures.  If the second allocation method 
was used, the ratio of foreign to worldwide sales would change to the ratio of foreign to 
worldwide sales and be multiplied by 50 per cent (0.5 * FS/WS).  For the following 
discussion, the corporation is assumed to use the second allocation method. 
 
The foreign tax credit is the lesser of the foreign taxes paid or the limitation amount but 
must not be less than zero.  The present value of foreign tax credit carryovers and the 
corporation’s ability to deduct foreign taxes rather than claiming the credit are not 
included in this foreign tax credit equation.  Thus, foreign tax credit is calculated as: 
 
Foreign Tax Credit = min(Foreign Income Taxes, [FSI – 0.5(FS/WS)*R&D]*tUS) (A) 
 
 
Impact on Marginal Tax Benefit of Domestic R&D Expenditures
31
 
The constraints outlined in equation (A) will determine the effect of the foreign tax credit 
limitations have on the marginal tax benefit of a domestic R&D expenditure.  The total 
tax liability for a U.S. multinational is: 
  Tax = USTax + FTax – FTC 
where:  Tax = total worldwide tax liability,  
USTax = U.S. income taxes on worldwide income, 
FTax = foreign income taxes, and 
FTC = foreign tax credit. 
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 The calculations outlined in this section follow similar calculations used by Collins and Shackelford 
(1992) and Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) to determine the impact of foreign tax credit limitations on the 




CASE A:  FTC = FTax   
This case can occur when the multinational is in a deficit foreign tax credit position (i.e. 
tus > average foreign tax rate) and there are no significant domestic losses.   In this case, 
the total tax liability will be equal to USTax and the marginal tax benefit of a domestic 
R&D expenditure will be determined by the U.S. corporate tax rate, tus.  Essentially, the 
foreign tax credit limitation does not have any effect on the marginal tax benefit of a 
domestic R&D expenditure.  This can be seen in the total tax calculation: 
 
 Tax = [USTax – R&D(tus)] + FTax - FTax  
  ∂Tax / ∂R&D = -tus 
 
 
CASE B: FTC = [FSI – 0.5(FS/WS)(R&D)]tus 
This case occurs when the multinational corporation is an excess foreign tax credit 
position (i.e. tus < average foreign tax rate) and domestic-source income is positive.  In 
this situation, the foreign tax credit is reduced by 0.5(FS/WS)tus with an increase in the 
allocable domestic R&D expenditures.  This means that the foreign tax credit limitation 
decreases the marginal tax benefit of a domestic R&D expenditure by the 0.5 (FS/WS) 
ratio as seen in the total tax calculation: 
 
Tax = [USTax – R&D(tus)] + FTax - [FTI – 0.5(FS/WS)(R&D)]tus 
 ∂Tax / ∂R&D = - tus[1 – 0.5(FS/WS)] 
 
 
CASE C: FTC = USTax    
This case occurs when domestic-source income is less than or equal to zero and FTax is 
greater than or equal to USTax.  If domestic-source income is less than or equal to zero, 
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the foreign tax credit limitation is equal to USTax.
32
 The corporation is in an excess 
foreign tax credit position if FTax is greater than or equal to USTax.  In this case, the 
marginal benefit of a domestic R&D expenditure is reduced to zero. The relation can be 
shown using the total tax calculation: 
 
Tax = [USTax – R&D(tus)] + FTax - [USTax – R&D(tus)] 
 ∂Tax / ∂R&D = -tus + tus = 0 
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 Recall that U.S. tax law restricts the ratio of foreign income to worldwide income to be less than or equal 
to one.  Thus, if the domestic-source income is negative and the foreign-source income is positive, the 







The B-Index model is a method of measuring the attractiveness of R&D tax systems 
among jurisdictions.  The B-Index is simply the ratio of the after-tax cost of a $1 
expenditure on R&D divided by 1 less the corporate income tax rate.  The after-tax cost is 
the net cost to the corporation of investing in R&D, taking into account the available tax 
incentives for R&D including: 
 the time period over which both current and capital expenditures on R&D may be 
written off against taxable income; 
 the existence of any deductions, including accelerated and bonus deductions, from 
taxable income that are based on the level or change in the level of R&D 
spending; 
 the availability of any tax credits that are based on the level or change in the level 
of R&D spending; and 
 the rate at which corporate income is taxed. 
The basic formula for the B-Index is as follows: 
 B = (1 – RDI)/(1 – t)  
Rearranging provides the formula for RDI: 
 RDI = 1 – B(1 – t)  
Where t is the corporate income tax rate and RDI is the net present value of the tax value 
of depreciation allowances, tax credits and the tax value of special allowances for R&D 
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assets.  In a country with a full write-off for R&D assets but no other incentives, RDI = t 




The calculation of the B-Index requires a number of simplifying assumptions.  First, the 
index assumes that firms have sufficient taxable income to claim the full amount of R&D 
tax incentives in the current year.  Due to this assumption, limits on income and caps on 
claimability of tax incentives are ignored.   Second, the B-Index model focuses on the tax 
treatment of R&D for large corporations as they generally perform the bulk of R&D.  
Third, the corporate tax rate or tax incentive is assumed to be applicable to the top 
income tax bracket.  In addition, the index does not differentiate between refundability 
and non-refundability provisions of tax incentives.  Finally, the B-Index formula ignores 
differences across countries in the definition of R&D, in the tax treatment of dividend and 
capital gains, in the personal income tax rates and in the interest rates. 
As an illustration, the B-Index for Australia is outlined below. 
Australian R&D Tax Incentives 
Australia does not offer any tax credits but under the R&D Tax Concession Law 
companies incorporate in Australia can write off up to 125 per cent of current 
expenditures for R&D incurred in the year.  Capital R&D expenditures for machinery and 
equipment can be written off at 125 per cent over three years on a straight-line basis.  
Capital expenditures on buildings face the normal write-off on a straight-line basis over 
40 years. 
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 The individual parameters used to calculate the B-Index are not available in most cases.  Thus, in 
calculating RDI from the B-Index, assumptions about the corporate tax rate were required and so, some 




Baus = (1 - .9z1t - .05t(z2 + z3)]/(1 – t) 
Where:  
t = corporate income tax rate (0.36); 
z1 = present value of current R&D expenditure (1.25); 
z2 =  present value of depreciation of R&D machinery and equipment (1.113); 
z3 = present value of depreciation of R&D buildings (0.269); 
.90 = proportion of R&D expenditure deducted immediately; and 
.05 = 




Based on this calculation, the B-index for Australia is 0.890.  In comparison to a country 
that provides 100% write-off of R&D expenditures (i.e. B = 1), Australia’s 125% write 
off is more attractive as indicated by the lower B-Index of 0.890.  Note that the RDI for 
Australia will be 0.430. 
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 Labour, current, capital and building components of R&D expenditures can be taxed differently.  To 
ensure comparability between jurisdictions, the proportion of R&D expenditures is always assumed to be 
90 per cent for current expenses (including 60 per cent for wages and salaries), 5 per cent for machinery 




Berger, Philip G. “Explicit and Implicit Tax Effects of the R&D Tax Credit.” Journal of 
Accounting Research, 1993, 31(2), pp.131. 
Berstein, J.I. “The effect of direct and indirect tax incentives on Canadian industrial R&D 
expenditures.” Canadian Public Policy, 12(3), pp. 438. 
Bloom, Nick, Rachel Griffith and John Van Reenen. "Do R&D Tax Credits Work? 
Evidence from a Panel of Countries 1979-1997." Journal of Public Economics, 
2002, 85(1), pp. 1.  
Brown, Jennifer L. and Linda K. Krull. “Stock Options, R&D and the R&D tax credit.”  
The Accounting Review, 2008, 83(3), pp. 705. 
Collins, Julie, Deen Kemsley and Mark Lang. "Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting and 
Earnings Valuation." Journal of Accounting Research, 1998, 36(2), pp. 209.  
Collins, Julie H. and Douglas A. Shackelford. "Foreign Tax Credit Limitations and 
Preferred Stock Issuances." Journal of Accounting Research, 1992, 30, pp. 103. 
Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith and A. Klemm. “Corporate Income Tax Reforms and 
International Tax Competition.” Economic Policy, 2002, 35, pp. 451. 
Drucker, Jesse. “Merck to Pay $2.3 Billion in Tax Case.” The Wall Street Journal, 
February 15, 2007. 
Drucker, Jesse. “How Merck Saved $1.5 Billion Paying Itself for Drug Patents.” The 
Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2006. 
Falk, Martin. “What drives business Research and Development intensity across 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries?” 
Applied Economics, 2006, 38, pp. 533. 
Francis, Jere R. and Clive S. Lennox. “Selection Models in Accounting Research.” 
Working Paper, February 2008, University of Missouri-Columbia and Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology. 
Furman, Jeffrey L., Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern. "The Determinants of National 
Innovative Capacity." Research Policy, 2002, 31(6), pp. 899.  
Gans, Joshua and Scott Stern. “Assessing Australia’s Innovative Capacity in the 21
st
  
Century.” Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, July 27, 2003. 
Ginarte, Juan C. and Walter G. Park. “Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national 
study.” Research Policy, 1997, 26, pp. 283. 
85 
 
Greene, William H. Econometric Analysis, 5
th
 ed. 2003: Pearson Education Inc. Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey. 
Griliches, Zvi. “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: a survey.” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 1990, 28(4), pp. 1661. 
Grubert, Harry. "Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting, and the 
Choice of Location." National Tax Journal, 2003, 56(1), pp. 221.  
Grubert, Harry and Joel Slemrod. "The Effect of Taxes on Investment and Income 
Shifting to Puerto Rico." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1998, 80(3), pp. 
365. 
Grubert, Harry and John Mutti. "Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational 
Corporate Decision Making." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1991, 73(2), 
pp. 285.  
Guellec, Dominique and Bruno Van Pottelsberghe. “The Impact of Public R&D 
Expenditure on Business R&D.” Economics, Innovation, and New Technology, 
2003, 12(3), pp. 225.  
Gupta, Sanjay, Yuhchang Hwang, and Andrew Schimdt. “R&D Spending Fools? An 
analysis of the R&D Credit’s Incentive Effects after the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989.” Working Paper, 2004, Arizona State University and 
Columbia University. 
Hall, B.H., Z. Griliches, and J.A. Hausman. “Patents and R&D: Is there a lag?” 
International Economic Review, 1986, 27(2), pp. 265. 
Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. “The NBER patent citations  
data file: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological tools.” NBER Working Paper no. 
8498, 2001. 
Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg. "Market Value and Patent 
Citations." The Rand Journal of Economics, 2005, 36(1), pp. 16.  
Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. “Market Value and Patent 
Citations: A First Look.” UCBerkley Working Paper No. E01-304, August, 2001. 
Hall, Bronwyn and John Van Reenen. “How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A 
review of the evidence?” Research Policy, 2000, 29, pp. 449. 
Harhoff, Dietmar, Francis Narin, F. M. Scherer and Katrin Vopel. "Citation Frequency 
and the Value of Patented Inventions." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
1999, 81(3), pp. 511-515.  
86 
 
Harris, David G. "The Impact of U.S. Tax Law Revision on Multinational Corporations' 
Capital Location and Income-Shifting Decisions." Journal of Accounting Research, 
1993, 31, pp. 111. 
Harris, David, Randall Morck, Joel Slemrod, and Bernard Yeung. “Income shifting in 
U.S. multinational corporations. In Studies in International Taxation, eds. A. 
Giovannini, R.G. Hubbard, and J. Slemrod, 1993, p. 277, Chicago: National Bureau 
of Economic Research and University of Chicago Press. 
Harman, D. “Tax policy and foreign direct investment.” Journal of Public Economics, 
1985, 26 (February), pp. 107. 
Heckman, James J. “Sample selection bias as a specification error.” Econometrica, 1979, 
47(1): pp.1251. 
Hines, James R., Jr. “No place like home: Tax incentives and the location of R&D by 
American multinationals.  In Tax policy and the economy, vol. 8, ed. James M. 
Poterba, 1994, pp. 65, Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Hines, James R., Jr.  “Taxes, technology transfer, and the R&D activities of multinational  
firms.” in the Effects of taxation on multinational corporations.  Ed. Martin 
Feldstein, James R Hines, and R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995, pp. 225, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hines, James R., Jr. “International Taxation and Corporate R&D: Evidence and 
Implications.” Borderline Case: International Tax Policy, Corporate Research and 
Development , and Investment, 1998, pp. 39. 
Hines, James R., Jr. and Adam B. Jaffe. “International Taxation and the location of  
inventive activity.” In International Taxation and Multinational Activity, ed. J.R.  
Hines, 2001, pp. 201. 
Hines, James R., Jr. and Eric M. Rice. “Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American 
Business. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109(1), pp. 149. 
Hirschey, Mark, Vernon J. Richardson and Susan Scholz. "Value Relevance of 
Nonfinancial Information: The Case of Patent Data." Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting, 2001, 17(3), pp. 223. 
Hufbauer, Gary C assisted by Joanna M. Van Rooij. U.S. Taxation of International 
Income: Blueprint for Reform, 1992, Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics.  
Jacob, John. "Taxes and Transfer Pricing: Income Shifting and the Volume of Intrafirm 
Transfers." Journal of Accounting Research, 1996, 34(2), pp. 301.  
87 
 
Jaffe, Adam B., Manuel Trajtenberg and Rebecca Henderson. "Geographic Localization 
of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations." The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 1993, 108(3), pp. 577.  
Kemsley, Deen. "The Effect of Taxes on Production Location." Journal of Accounting 
Research, 1998, 36(2), pp. 321. 
Klassen, Kenneth, Mark Lang and Mark Wolfson. "Geographic Income Shifting by 
Multinational Corporations in Response to Tax Rate Changes." Journal of 
Accounting Research, 1993, 31, pp. 141.  
Klassen, Kenneth J.and Stacie Laplante. “Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting: 
Employing a Multi-year Approach. Working Paper, October 2008, University of 
Waterloo and University of Georgia. 
Klassen, Kenneth J., Jeffrey A. Pittman and Margaret P. Reed. "A Cross-National 
Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial 
Constraints." Contemporary Accounting Research, 2004, 21(3), pp. 639.  
Krull, Linda K. "Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings, Taxes, and Earnings 
Management." The Accounting Review, 2004, 79(3), pp. 745.  
Kuemmerle, Walter. “The drivers of foreign direct investment into research and 
development.” Journal of International Business Studies, 1999, 30(1), pp. 1. 
Kumar, Nagesh. "Determinants of Location of Overseas R&D Activity of Multinational 
Enterprises: The Case of US and Japanese corporations " Research Policy, 2001, 
30(1), pp. 159.  
Lanjouw, Jean O. and Mark Schankerman. "Patent Quality and Research Productivity: 
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators." The Economic Journal, 2004, 114 
(495), pp. 441.  
Mansfield, Edwin, David Teece, and Anthony Romeo. “Overseas Research and 
Development by US-Based Firms.” Economica, 1979, 46, pp. 187. 
Mataloni, Raymond. “Operations of U.S. Multinational Companies in 2005.” Survey of 
Current Business, November 2007, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Matthews, Thomas A. Does Home-Country Taxation of Foreign Earnings Affect Cross-
Jurisdictional Income Shifting? University of Waterloo, 2002.  
Mills, Lillian F. and Kaye J. Newberry. "Do Foreign Multinationals' Tax Incentives 
Influence their U.S. Income Reporting and Debt Policy?" National Tax Journal, 
2004, 57(1), pp. 89.  
88 
 
Newberry, Kaye J. and Dan S. Dhaliwal. "Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting by U.S. 
Multinationals: Evidence from International Bond Offerings." Journal of Accounting 
Research, 2001, 39(3), pp. 643.  
OECD. 1996. Fiscal Measures to Promote R&D Innovation. OECD Press. Paris. 
 
OECD. 2005. Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard. OECD Press. Paris. 
 
OECD. 2007. Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard.  OECD Press. Paris. 
 
Porter, Michael E., Scott Stern and the Council on Competitiveness. The New Challenge  
to America’s Prosperity: Findings from the Innovation Index. 1999, COC: 
Washington. 
Puhani, Patrick A. “The Heckman Correction for Sample Selection and its Critique.” 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 2000, 14(1), pp. 53. 
Petersen, Mitchell A. “Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: 
Comparing Approaches.” The Review of Financial Studies, 2009, 27(1), pp. 435. 
Rashkin, Michael. Practical Guide to Research and Development Tax Incentives. 2007: 
CCH, Chicago. 
Rego, Sonja Olhoft. "Tax-Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations." 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 2003, 20(4), pp. 805.  
Scholes, Myron S., Mark A. Wolfson, Merle Erikson, Edward L. Maydew, and Terry 
Shevlin. Taxes and business strategy: a planning approach. 2002: Upper Saddle 
River, NJ. Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Serrano, C.J. “The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents.” NBER Working  
     Paper, No. W13938, April 2008. 
Stata Web Books. Regression with Stata.  Chapter 2 – Regression Diagnostics.  UCLA: 
Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group. from 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/statareg2.htm. 
Sullivan, Martin A. 2004. “Economic Analysis: Data Show U.S. Companies Shifting 
Profits to Tax Havens.” Tax Notes International, September 20, 2004, 35, pp. 1035. 
Union Bank of Switzerland. Price and Earnings Around the Globe, Zurich. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. direct investment 
abroad: 1999 benchmark survey, final results, 2001, Washington, D.C.: GPO. 
89 
 
Vines, Cynthia C. and Michael L. Moore. "U.S. Tax Policy and the Location of R&D." 
The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 1996, 18(2), pp. 74.  
Warda, Jacek. “Measuring the value of R&D tax provisions, in OECD.” Fiscal Measures 
to promote R&D and Innovation, 1996, OECD, Paris, pp. 9. 
Warda, Jacek. “Measuring the value of R&D Tax Treatment in OECD countries.” STI 
Review No. 27, 2002, OECD, Paris, pp. 185 
Yorgason, Daniel R. “Research and Development Activities of U.S. Multinational 
Corporations.” Survey of Current Business, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
























Australia 0.89 36% 100% 3 years 40 years A 125%  
Austria 0.88 34% 100% 5 years 25 years A 125% 35% 
Belgium 1.01 40% 100% 3 years 20 years A 113.5%  
Canada (Fed) 0.83 32% 100% 100% 4% TC 20%  
Denmark 0.87 52% 100% 100% 100% A 125%  
Finland 1.01 28% 100% 25% 20% -   
France 0.92 40% 100% 40% 20 years TC  50% 
Germany 1.04 52% 100% 30% 4% -   
Ireland 0.94 10% 100% 7 years 4% A  40% 
Italy 1.03 41% 100% 10 years 33 years TC 30%  
Japan 0.98 41% 100% 18% 50 years TC  20% 
Korea 0.92 31% 100% 5 years 5 years TC  50% 
Mexico 0.97 35% 100% 35% 20 years TC  20% 
Netherlands 0.90 35% 100% 5 years 25 years TC 12.5%  
Norway 1.02 28% 100% 20% 5% -   
Portugal 0.85 37% 100% 4 years 20 years TC 8% 30% 
Spain 0.69 35% 100% 100% 33 years TC 20% 40% 
Sweden 1.02 28% 100% 30% 25 years -   
Switzerland 1.01 32% 100% 40% 8% -   
United Kingdom 1.00 30% 100% 100% 100% -   
United States (Fed) 0.93 35% 100% 5 years 39 years TC  20% 
1 
For large corporations 
2
 Corporate Income Tax Rate (CIT) 
 




Illustration of U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules 
 
  No allocation rules/ No royalties R&D Allocation Rules R&D Allocation & Royalties 
  Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 1 Situation 2 
U.S. Income  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Foreign Income:  600 600 600 600 600 600 
Adjustments for FTC calculation:        
    R&D Allocation
1
  - - (20) (20) (20) (20) 
    Royalty Payment  - - - - 100 100 
Foreign-Source Income for FTC:  600 600 580 580 680 680 
        
U.S. Tax Rate  35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 
Average Foreign Tax Rate  20% 50% 20% 50% 20% 50% 
        
Foreign Taxes Paid:
2
  120 300 120 300 120 300 
FTC Limitation  210 210 203 203 238 238 
FTC = min(Foreign Taxes, FTC limitation) 120 210 120 203 120 238 
        
U.S. Taxes Before FTC
3
  560 560 560 560 560 560 
FTC  120 210 120 203 120 238 
U.S. Taxes after FTC  440 350 440 357 440 322 
        
Worldwide Tax Liability
4
  560 650 560 657 560 622 
        
Additional assumptions:  The U.S. income includes $200 in R&D expenditures and $100 royalty payments from a foreign subsidiary.  U.S. sales 
are $4,000 and Foreign sales are $1,000. 
 
1
 Based on sales allocation method described in Appendix A, the allocation is determined as 50% * foreign sales/worldwide sales * R&D expenditures  
or 50% * ($1,000/$5,000) *$200. 
2
 Foreign Income * tF 
3
 (U.S. Income + Foreign Income) * tUS 
4











Industry Main Sample 
Selection Model 
Sample Name 
Grouping Frequency Percent Frequency Percent  
      
1 67 1.7 217 3.2 Consumer NonDurables 
2 219 5.6 375 5.6 Consumer Durables 
3 929 23.5 1,806 26.9 Manufacturing 
4 64 1.6 112 1.7 Oil, Gas and Coal 
Extraction and Products 
5 572 14.5 754 11.2 Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
6 1,340 33.9 2,396 35.7 Business Equipment  
7 0 0 0 0 Telephone and Television 
Transmission 
8 0 0 0 0 Utilities 
9 4 0.1 7 0.1 Wholesale, Retail and 
Some Services 
10 739 18.7 980 14.6 Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs 
11 0 0 0 0 Finance 
12 14 0.4 61 0.9 Other 
      





Sample Characteristics (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Annual Breakdown 
 
 Main Sample Selection Model Sample 
Year Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
     
1986 158 4.0 302 4.5 
1987 174 4.4 316 4.7 
1988 179 4.5 324 4.8 
1989 182 4.6 330 4.9 
1990 188 4.8 340 5.1 
1991 177 4.5 338 5.0 
1992 215 5.5 421 6.3 
1993 276 7.0 494 7.4 
1994 294 7.5 517 7.7 
1995 331 8.4 562 8.4 
1996 375 9.5 585 8.7 
1997 425 10.8 636 9.5 
1998 331 8.4 552 8.2 
1999 343 8.7 528 7.9 
2000 300 7.6 463 6.9 
     






Sample Characteristics (continued) 
 
Panel C: Country Breakdown for Main Sample 
 
Country Frequency Percent 
   
Australia 119 3.0 
Austria 25 0.6 
Belgium 187 4.7 
Canada 486 12.3 
Denmark 63 1.6 
Finland 14 0.4 
France 406 10.3 
Germany 512 13.0 
Great Britain 714 18.1 
Ireland 107 2.7 
Italy 190 4.8 
Japan 436 11.0 
Korea 65 1.7 
Mexico 26 0.7 
Netherlands 224 5.7 
Norway 29 0.7 
Portugal 7 0.2 
Spain 66 1.7 
Switzerland 152 3.9 
Sweden 120 3.0 
   





















ln(Total Assets)  0.202*** 
(16.91) 
   
R
2
 0.501 0.520 
N 7,064 7,064 
Note: *** statistically significant at 1% in a two-tailed test.   
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from regressing the log of total patents on the log of R&D 
expenditures using OLS.  Column (1) reports the regression without consideration for firm size while 






Descriptive Statistics for Firms with Foreign R&D Activities 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
     
PATENT%i,j,t 0.087 0.022 0.0001 1.000 0.183 
RDIj,t 0.383 0.384 0.083 0.692 0.095 
ALLOCi,t 0.123 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.201 
Average FTRi,t 0.327 0.346 0.000 0.980 0.174 
Statutory FTRj,t 0.398 0.360 0.100 0.627 0.103 
FTCi,t 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
I_Indexj,t 0.775 0.687 0.004 1.972 0.443 
RDWagej,t 10.638 10.631 9.012 11.193 0.298 
FSRi,t 0.436 0.449 0.002 1.000 0.155 
Qi,t 0.577 0.493 -2.347 3.476 0.548 
ROAi,t 0.130 0.125 -0.415 0.885 0.094 
CITESi,t 4.012 2.591 -5.203 51.618 4.710 
InvMillsi,t 0.404 0.251 0.001 3.302 0.431 
      
The sample of firms with foreign R&D activities consists of 3,948 firm-years for 413 firms in 20 OECD 
countries for the period 1986 to 2000.   PATENT%i,j,t denotes the portion of patents developed in a foreign 
country divided by the total number of patents in all countries granted to a firm.  RDIj,t is the present value 
of R&D tax incentives available in country j in year t as calculated by Warda (1996).  ALLOCi,t is a 
continuous measure of the impact of the foreign tax credit limitation on the marginal benefit of domestic 
R&D deductions with zero equaling no impact and one equaling maximum impact.  The average FTRi,t is 
the firm-specific tax rate calculated as current and deferred foreign taxes divided by foreign pretax income 
while the statutory FTRj,t is the country-specific statutory foreign corporate tax rate.  FTCi,t is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is in an excess foreign tax credit position and zero if the firm is in a deficit 
foreign tax credit position. I_Indexi,t is an index of the innovation environment of country j in year t 
developed by Porter and Stern (1999).   RDWagej,t is the natural logarithm of R&D wages of engineers of 
comparable qualifications in the jth country.  FSRi,t is foreign sales divided by worldwide sales for firm i in 
year t and Qi,t is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q.  ROAi,t is the pre-R&D return on assets and CITESi,t is 
the average number of patent citations for firm i in year t less the average # of citations in the industry for 







Pearson Correlation Table 
(n = 3948) 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1.  PATENT%i,j,t            
2.  RDIj,t 0.016           
3.  ALLOCi,t -0.027 0.009          
4.  Average FTRi,t -0.106 0.054 0.466         
5.  FTCi,t -0.065 0.029 0.642 0.726        
6.  I_Indexj,t 0.043 -0.333 -0.019 -0.027 -0.025       
7.  RDWagej,t -0.007 -0.199 -0.026 -0.072 -0.029 0.595      
8.  FSRi,t -0.102 -0.078 0.263 0.101 0.105 0.038 0.050     
9. Qi,t -0.074 -0.077 -0.080 -0.036 -0.060 0.060 0.101 0.070    
10. ROAi,t -0.131 -0.037 -0.025 0.101 0.017 0.052 0.051 0.126 0.592   
11. CITESi,t -0.010 0.087 0.029 0.046 0.060 -0.080 -0.094 0.060 -0.150 0.019  
12. InvMillsi,t 0.448 0.043 -0.160 -0.199 -0.102 -0.018 -0.029 -0.506 -0.157 -0.240 0.030 





Comparative Descriptive Statistics for Firms with Foreign R&D Activities vs. Firms 
with Domestic R&D Activities Only 
 
Variable N Mean  Median Standard 
Deviation 
      
Panel A: Foreign R&D Firms     
      
ALLOCi,t 3,948 0.123***  0.000 0.201 
FSRi,t 3,948 0.436***  0.449 0.155 
ROAi,t 3,948 0.130***  0.125 0.094 
LnTAi,t 3,948 8.193***  8.455 1.680 
RDIntensityi,t 3,948 0.083***    0.062 0.162 
CITESi,t 3,948 4.012***  2.591 4.710 
      
Panel B: Domestic R&D only Firms     
      
ALLOCi,t 2,760 0.066  0.000 0.159 
FSRi,t 2,760 0.290  0.269 0.169 
ROAi,t 2,760 0.094  0.096 0.156 
LnTAi,t 2,760 5.846  5.769 1.605 
RDIntensityi,t 2,760 0.083  0.038 0.302 
CITESi,t 2,760 5.064  2.021 9.745 
      
Note: *, **, and *** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, between foreign R&D firms 
and domestic only firms. 
 
ALLOCi,t is a continuous measure of the impact of the foreign tax credit limitation on the marginal benefit 
of domestic R&D deductions with zero equaling no impact and one equaling maximum impact.  FSRi,t is 
foreign sales divided by worldwide sales for firm i in year t and ROAi,t is the pre-R&D return on assets.  
LnTAi,t is the natural logarthim of total assets and RDIntensityi,t is R&D expenditures divided by worldwide 
sales for firm i in year t.  CITESi,t is the average number of patent citations for firm i in year t less the 






Results from Second Stage of Heckman (1979) Two Step Regression 
 
PATENT%i,j,t = 0 + 1RDIj,t + 2ALLOCi,t + 3FTRi,t + 4FTCi,t +  5FTRi,t*FTCi,t +  
+ 6I_Indexj,t + 7RDWagej,t + 8FSRi,t + 9Qi,t  + 10ROAi,t +11CITESi,t 
+ 12InvMillsi,t + ∑13YEARt + ∑14INDi+ i,j,t  
 



















FTRi,t ? 0.108*** 
(2.85) 
 
FTRj,t ?  -0.020 
(-0.41) 




FTRi,t*FTCi,t - -0.220*** 
(-3.66) 
 
FTRj,t*FTCi,t -  0.001 
(0.01) 































  0.288 0.284 
N  3,948 3,925 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with 
a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.   Column (1) estimates the two-stage Heckman (1979) 
using the average foreign tax rate (FTRi,t) while Column (2) uses the country statutory tax rate (FTRj,t). 
 





Results from First Stage of Heckman (1979) Two Step Regression 
 
 
ABROADi,t = 0 + 1ALLOCi,t + 2FSRi,t +3ROAi,t + 4LnTAi,t + 5RDIntensityi,t +  
6CITESi,t + ∑7YEARt + ∑8 INDi + i,t 
 
Explanatory Variable Predicted Sign 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
   
Intercept ? -4.600*** 
(-29.05) 
ALLOCi,t + 0.349*** 
(3.17) 
FSRi,t + 2.307*** 
(19.55) 
ROAi,t + 0.445*** 
(2.48) 
LnTAi,t + 0.451*** 
(37.22) 
RDIntensityi,t + 0.189*** 
(2.57) 
CITESi,t ? -0.009*** 
(-2.80) 
   
Pseudo R
2
  0.3732 
N  6,708 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables 
with a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise. 
 







Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
 















Mean VIF 3.93 
  



















RDIj,t   
0.150** 
(2.20) 
RDI_Bloomj,t  0.171* 
(1.63) 
 












































    
R
2
  0.295 0.293 
N  2,143 2,143 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with 
a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) reports estimations of the regression using 
RDI_Bloom.  Column (2) re-estimates regression with RDI but on the reduced sample used to test 
RDI_Bloom. 
 
See Table 5 for variable definitions except RDI_Bloom.  RDI_Bloom is the present value of tax incentives 
available in country j in year t as calculated by Bloom et al. (2002). Year and industry coefficients 






Specification Check of FTR Measure: 
Main Empirical Model 
 
PATENT%i,j,t = 0 + 1 RDI j,t + 2 ALLOC i,t + 3 FTR i,t + 4 FTC i,t + 5 FTR i,t* FTC i,t  
+ 6 IndexI _ j,t + 7 RDWage j,t + 8 FSR i,t + 9 Q i,t  + 10 ROA i,t 





























































    
R
2
  0.278 0.277 
N  3,537 3,833 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with 
a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.   Column (1) reports results using 5-year averages of 
explanatory variables and column (2) reports results using 3-year averages.  
 
See Table 5 for variable definitions except the variables in this Table are measured over 5 or 3 years 
except for CITESi,t and PATENTi,j,t.  CITESi,t  and PATENT%i,j,t are not averaged but measured annually.  





Specification Check of FTR Measure:  
Selection Model 
 
ABROADi,t = 0 + 1 ALLOC i,t + 2 FSR i,t + 3 ROA i,t + 4 LnTA i,t   







































   
Pseudo R
2
 0.400 0.360 
N 2,103 2,512 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables 
with a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise. Column (1) reports results using 5-year average of 
explanatory variables and column (2) reports results using 3-year averages. 
 
See Table 7 for variable definitions except the variables in this Table are measured over 5 or 3 years 
except for CITESi,t and PATENTi,j,t.  CITESi,t  and PATENT%i,j,t are not averaged but measured annually.  































































































(2.83) 1.96     
GERDj,t 
0.073** 
(2.34) 51.76   
0.013*** 




































































































































         
R
2
 0.295  0.293  0.293  0.292  
N 3,846  3,846  3,855  3,855  
106 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with a sign 
prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) estimates of regression replacing I_Indexj,t with 
RDPersonj,t, GERDj,t, GDP_Capitaj,t, GDPj,t, IPRj,t, IndFundj,t and Specializationj,t.  The remaining columns 
estimate the regression in column (1) but include RDPersonj,t, GERDj,t, and GDPj,t separately.  Column (2) 
includes only RDPersonj,t, column (3) includes only GERDj,t and column (4) includes only GDPj,t.  Year 
and Industry coefficients included but not reported. 
 
See Table 5 for variable definitions except for the following.  RDPersonj,t is the natural logarithm of the 
aggregate personnel employed in R&D and GERDj,t is the natural logarithm of total R&D expenditures in 
Year 2000 US$.  IPRj,t measures the strength of protection for intellectual property.  GDP_capitaj,t is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita and GDPj,t is the natural logarithm of GDP.  IndFundj,t is the R&D 
expenditures funded by industry divided by the total R&D expenditures in country j and Specializationj,t is 
the total # of patents in ICT and BIO technology in country j divided by total # patents in ICT and BIO 






Pearson Correlation Table: Country-Level Variables 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. RDIj,t           
2.  I_Indexj,t -0.350          
3. RDPersonj,t 0.059 0.442         
4.  GERDj,t -0.021 0.467 0.983        
5.  IPRj,t -0.317 0.335 0.143 0.204       
6.  GDPj,t 0.047 0.322 0.970 0.957 0.167      
7.  GDP_Capitaj,t -0.386 0.814 0.371 0.390 0.330 0.248     
8..  IndFundj,t -0.343 0.723 0.244 0.274 0.383 0.126 0.581    
9.  Specializationj,t -0.039 0.668 0.650 0.608 0.161 0.546 0.609 0.615   
10. RDWagej,t -0.216 0.579 0.159 0.196 0.390 0.134 0.552 0.413 0.209  





































































    
R
2
  0.252 0.223 
N  3,729 3,485 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with 
a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) and column (2) report the results of 
estimating the regression equation using one- and two-year lags, respectively 
 








Specification Check of the Estimation Approach: 






















































































LnTAi,t   
-0.049*** 
(-21.15) 
RDIntensityi,t   
-0.033* 
(-1.64) 
InvMillsi,t 0.198   
R
2
 0.209 0.0671 0.236 
N 3,948 3,948 3,948 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with 
a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) reports estimation of equation (7) using 
MLE approach.  Column (2) and (3) estimate equation (7) using OLS.  Column (3) includes additional 
variables, lnTA and RDIntensity, which are not in equation (7).  
 






Specification Check of the Estimation Approach:  
Selection Model (MLE only) 
 





   
Intercept  -2.533 
(-17.72) 
FSRi,t  1.792 
(22.52) 
ROAi,t  0.352 
(3.36) 
LnTAi,t  0.188 
(14.50) 
RDIntensityi,t  -0.102 
(-3.03) 
CITESi,t  -0.010 
(-3.84) 
   
   
N  8,493 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables 
with a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise. Column (1) reports estimation of equation (8) 
using MLE approach.   
 






Alternative Specifications of the Equation (7) to Address Multicollinearity 
 







FTC and FTR*FTC 
(z-statistic) 








ALLOCi,t   
0.039** 
(1.91) 
FTRi,t  0.105*** 
(2.76) 
 
FTCi,t  0.074*** 
(3.14) 
 
FTRi,t*FTCi,t  -0.221*** 
(-3.69) 
 




























    
R
2
  0.288 0.284 
N  3,948 3,948 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with 
a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.   Column (1) reports the estimation of equation (7) 
without ALLOC and Column (2) reports without FTR, FTC and FTR*FTC.  
 


































































































































     
R
2
 0.268 0.266 0.267 0.276 
N 3,114 3,114 3,114 1,489 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables with a sign 
prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) estimates the regression in equation (7) excluding 
firms with negative pretax domestic or foreign income.  Column (2) and (3) estimates the regression in 
equation (7) without ALLOC and FTR, FTC and FTR*FTC, respectively excluding firms with negative 
pretax domestic or foreign income.  Column (4) estimate equation (7) allowing one observation per firm 
per year.  
 







Specification Check Examining Dependence of Errors: 































































   
R
2
 0.251 0.288 
N 335 3,948 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for 
variables with a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) estimates 
equation (7) using only the first observation of a firm in the main sample.  Column (2) 
estimates equation (7) on the main sample using standard errors clustered by firm. 
 

















Standard Errors Clustered 
by Firm 
(z-statistic) 





























   
Pseudo R
2
 0.101 0.3732 
N 953 6,708 
Note: *, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, with a one-tailed test for variables 
with a sign prediction and a two-tailed test, otherwise.  Column (1) estimates equation (8) using only the 
first observation of a firm in the main sample.  Column (2) estimates equation (8) on the main sample 
using standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
See Table 7ered by firm. 
  
See Table 7 for variable definitions.  Year and industry coefficients included but not reported. 
 
